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TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE 
DENATIONALIZATION OF THE LATIN AMERICAN 
CIGARETTE INDUSTRY 
Dialogue # I7  
By: P h i  l i p  Shepherd 
PREFACE 
P h i l i p  L. Shepherd i s  a s s i s t a n t  p ro fesso r  o f  marke t ing  and 
environment i n  t h e  Co l lege  o f  Business Admin i s t r a t i on .  A s tudent  
o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c a l  economy, D r .  Shepherd i s  a  member o f  
t h e  Cont inu ing  Working Group on L a t i n  America and t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
System: T ransna t i ona l  Corpora t ions  i n  L a t i n  America o f  t h e  J o i n t  
Committee on L a t i n  American Studies, t h e  S o c i a l  Science Research 
Counci l .  H i s  manuscript, The Dynamics o f  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C i g a r e t t e  
O l i gopo l y  i s  c u r r e n t l y  under review. Th i s  paper was o r i g i n a l l y  pre- 
sented a t  t h e  L a t i n  American S tud ies  A s s o c i a t i o n  Meet ing i n  Mexico 
City,  September 29-October 2, 1983. 
Mark B. Rosenberg 
D i  r e c t o r  
In t roduct ion 
I The l a s t  35 years  have witnessed some ext raordinary  changes i n  t h e  world I tobacco industry.  For example, the  expansion, abroad of  U.S. c i g a r e t t e  companies 
(which had been domestical ly o r i en ted  from 1911 t o  1952) f i r s t  led t o  the  break- 
down of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  cooperation among t h e  major producers (a  de f a c t o  c a r t e l )  
i n  the  1960's and 1970's and, then, t o  t h e  reestablishment of g lobal  "equ i l i -  
I b r i m "  i n  recen t  years. This, i n  t u n ,  s i g n i f i e d  the  emergence of a  t r u l y  g lobal ,  I highly concentrated t r ansna t iona l  c i g a r e t t e  industry.  I Likewise, o the r  changes have had considerable impact on t h e  industry.  Medi- 
c a l  research i n  t h e  l a s t  th ree  decades has incrdas ingly  revealed t h e  l e t h a l  s i d e  
of t h e  indus t ry ,  impl ica t ing smoking with a  wide v a r i e t y  of i l l n e s s e s ,  usual ly  
terminal: lung, mouth, t h r o a t  and bladder cancers,  emphysema, cardiovascular  
d iseases  and so  f o r t h  (USDHEW, 1979). The development of t h e  smoking and hea l th  
I i s s u e  i n  a l l  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  nat ions  has caused s t agna t ing  and even dec l in ing  
I 
c i g a r e t t e  s a l e s  i n  those nat ions ,  thus leading t o  a  s h i f t  i n  growth t o  LDC's 
where, f o r  a  v a r i e t y  of reasons, t h e  pub l ic  h e a l t h  i s s u e  is much less s a l i e n t .  
The major c i g a r e t t e  f irms have the re fo re  turned t o  LDC markets f o r  fu tu re  growths, 
A l l  t hese  developments have been highly i n t e r r e l a t e d  and l inked t o  s t i l l  
others:  (1) the  ever-increasing predominance of c i g a r e t t e s  wi th in  t h e  tobacco 
indust ry  t o  t h e  po in t  where o the r  products ( c iga r s ,  chewing, e t c .  ) have been 
completely overshadowed and t h e  c i g a r e t t e  indus t ry  equals  t h e  tobacco indus t ry  
b i n  most nat ions ;  (2)  dramatic changes i n  demand c rea t ion  ("marketing") s t r a t e -  
g ies  and techniques which have enabled t h e  major f irms t o  hold onto o lde r  mar- 
kets  and expand new ones; (3)  d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  i n t o  non-tobacco l i n e s  of business 
by t h e  leading producers t o  cushion t h e  impact of t h e  smoking/health i s s u e  ef -  
f e c t s  i n  home nat ions  and make e f f e c t i v e  use of t h e  l a rge  cash  flow generated 
by c i g a r e t t e s  (a complementary s t r a t e g y  t o  expanding abroad i n  c i g a r e t t e s ) ;  
(4) considerable changes i n  the technology of tobacco farming, marketing and cig- 
a r e t t e  manufacture i n  the d i rec t ion  of much more capital-intensive production; and 
(5) changes i n  the  in te rna t iona l  t rade of leaf tobacco and c igare t tes ,  leading 
t o  the  r i s e  of LDC's  a s  major leaf producers while D C ' s  continue t o  dominate 
t rade i n  manufactures. 
I have reviewed these changes and the pecul iar ,  often fascinating,  his tory 
and s t ruc ture  of the  industry elsewhere (Shepherd, 1979, 1981). In  the present 
study, I w i l l  examine pa r t  of another i n t e r e s t i ng  change t h a t  took place i n  the  
post-1950 era: the  v i r t u a l  disappearance of nationally-owned tobacco firms i n  
many ares of t he  world and t h e i r  replacement by a  t ransnat ional  corporate sub- 
s id ia ry  (usually of Anglo-American parentage). T h i s  process of "denationaliza- 
t i on )  has been especial ly  evident i n  Latin America, but it has a lso taken place 
t o  a  surpr is ing degree i n  Europe, Canada, Asia and, indeed, wherever there  were 
nat ional  tobacco firms t o  be acquired. Even S ta te  tobacco monopolies i n  indus- 
b 
t r i a l i z e d  nations l i k e  I t a l y ,  France and Japan have not been immune. They have 
been under immense t ransnat ional  corporate pressure, both through commercial 
means and through the "pol i t i ca l"  bargaining process i n  EEC i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  t rade 
t a l k s ,  e tc .  ("Former Government Aide, " 1975) . 
Thus, this work focuses on two broad topics:  (1) How and why denation- 
a l iza t ion  of Latin American c iga re t t e  indus t r ies  occurred; and ( 2 )  some of the 
major e f f ec t s  of denationalization,  including i t s  impact on tha agr icu l tura l  
sector of the  industry. 
1 .  
/ 
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Historic,al Emergence of Latin American Cigarette Industr ies  
I n  Latin America, tobacco of ten played an important p a r t  i n  the economic 
and p o l i t i c a l  struggles of the colonial  era. For example, the famous "Comunero" 
rebel l ion i n  Socorro, Colombia i n  1781, one of the precursors of the drive f o r  
Independence, was i n i t i a l l y  a pro tes t  against  po l ic ies  with respect t o  the grow- 
ing  and marketing of tobacco under the Crown tobacco Monopoly (Leonard, 1951). 
The deeply-felt hatred of the  colonial  monopoly eventually led t o  the  dismant- 
l i n g  of most Latin American tobacco monopolies (Stein and Stein,  1970:123-57; 
Harrison, 1952; McGreevey, 1971:lll-18). Only Peru and Ecuador have had s t a t e  
monopolies i n  the 20th century ( in  Peru, the monopoly dated from 1904, not the  
19th century). While both of these survived i n t o  the 19501s, they have subse- 
quently been "privatized." 
Under the onslaught of sentiment f a r  " f ree  trade" i n  the  mid-19th century, 
most Latin American tobacco indus t r ies  thus became a t  l e a s t  formally "private." 
A s  Latin America was increasingly Linked i n t o  the  internat ional  system of t rade,  
nations there experimented with various commodities i n  which they might enjoy 
some comparative advantage i n  order t o  finance increasing imports of manufactured 
and other goods from the more industr ia l ized nations. Tobacco of ten figured as  
one of these primary products and various "export booms" centered on tobacco 
took place. For example, tobacco became Colombia's most important export com- 
modity i n  the mid-19th century, and was intimately involved i n  a number of very 
important p o l i t i c a l  economic events there during the 19th century (.tiarrison, 
1952;. Sierra ,  197 1; McGreevey, 1971: 97-183) , Tobacco exports were a lso impor- 
t a n t  a t  various times i n  Brazil ,  p a r t s  of Central America and the Caribbean, 
Peru, and, of course, Cuba. Domestically, tobacco production and consumption 
"was a c ruc ia l  factor  i n  governments1 revenue i n  v i r tua l ly  a l l  Latin American 
nations both before and a f t e r  Independence (Stein and Stein., 1970: 7 1-74 and 
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Latin American tobacco indus t r ies  were based on locally-grown, "dark to- 
bacco," (tabaco negro) largely used for  c igars ,  snuff and chewing i n  the pre- 
c iga re t t e  era. "Dark," air-cured tobaccos of t h i s  type were (and s t i l l  a re )  
t r ad i t i ona l ly  favored i n  ares  of Spanish o r  Latin cu l tu ra l  influence. I n  the 
l a t e  19th century, the c iga re t t e  came along a f t e r  cigar-type leaf production 
was already well-established i n  Latin America. Thus, ea r ly  Latin American 
c iga re t t e  producers found it natural  t o  make c igare t tes  from cigar  leaf cut- 
t ings  (Brooks, 1952:257-58). T h i s  is  the reason why Latin America t rad i tona l ly  
had dark tobacco (tabaco negro) c igare t tes  instead of the hriglo Ame~ican types 
of l i gh t  tobacco (tabaco rubio) blends. 1 
LatinAmerican tobacco firms often played important ro les  i n  the ear ly  
stages of import subs t i tu t ion  industriaLization ( ISI )  i n  the  region. Most 
Latin American c iga re t t e  firms date  from the ear ly  years of the 20th centurly 
and some from the 1890's. Cigarette production and tobacco manufacture i n  
general was a prime candidate fo r  IS1 e f for t s :  Tobacco products were a luxury 
t o  import; domestic raw materials i n  the form of leaf tobacco were readi ly  
available;  some loca l  fami l ia r i ty  with the industry was often present; the  
scale  requirements were not large; the  technology was not unduly d i f f i c u l t  t o  
acquire o r  adapt t o  location conditions; agr icu l tura l  production of leaf was 
labor-intensive; c iga re t t e  manufacturing did not require  much s i l l e d  labor,  and 
so forth.  The industry was thus idea l ly  sui ted fo r  import subs t i tu t ion  indus- 
t r i a l i z a t i o n ,  a s  was the case with other agr icu l tura l  processing sectors.  I t  
a l so  had the added advantage of providing considerable t ax  revenues fo r  the 
s t a t e  (through c igare t te  taxes) and cu t t ing  down on "non-essential" imports t o  
ease balance of payments problems. Thus, it is not surpr is ing t h a t  the industry 
frequently received subs tan t ia l  (and ear ly)  e f f ec t ive  t a r i f f  protection.  
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a f t e r  1900 o r  so. Subs tan t i a l  l o c a l  i n d u s t r i e s  developed i n  protec ted  markets 
a l l  over Latin America, but  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  Argentina, Mexico, Brazi l ,  Colombia, 
Chile and Peru. I n  a v a r i e t y  of nat ions,  inc luding Cuba, Paraguay, Braz i l  and 
Colombia, l ea f  exports  of tobacco were a l s o  important.  Because of i ts  re la -  
t i v e  importance i n  IS1 and i t s  r o l e  a s  a source of governmental revenue, Latin 
Aerican tobacco i n d i s t r i e s  have played key r o l e s  i n  t h e  political-economic his-  
t o r y  of a number of nat ions  i n  t h e  20th century. 
I n  t h e  l a r g e s t  markets of t h e  region l i k e  Argentina, Braz i l  and Mexico, 
2 British-American Tobacco, Ltd. (BAT) entered the  indust ry  f a i r l y  e a r l y  (of t e n  
j u s t  p r i o r  t o  o r  a f t e r  WW I )  , f requent ly  acquir ing a l o c a l  firm, Aggressively 
carving ou t  large  market shares,  BAT frequent ly  m e t  wi th  considerable opposi- 
t i o n  from owners of na t iona l  firms, t h e  na t iona l  bourgeiosie i n  genera l ,  and 
o the rs  who feared fore ign penet ra t ion  and c o n t r o l  of t h e  l o c a l  economy. I n  
some nat ions ,  such a s  Colombia, BAT was unable t o  gain permanent foothold 
i n  t h e  market (Shepherd, 1981) . However BAT usual ly  followed a low-profile, 
" l i v e  and l e t  l ive"  s t r a t e g y  f o r  deal ing wi th  economic nationalism, and sub- 
s t a n t i a l  l o c a l  f i rms o f ten  grew up alongside BAT subs id ia r i e s  i n  some markets. 
Later  on these  l o c a l l y  owned f irms made r a t h e r  a t t r a c t i v e  t a r g e t s  f o r  TNC I 
acquis i t ion .  It was only wi th  t h e  wholesale take-over of these  f irms by other  I 
( l a rge ly  U.S.) TNC's i n  t h e  1960's t h a t  Lat in  American tobacco i n d u s t r i e s  I 
were e f f e c t i v e l y  "denationalized. " I 
The Process of Denationalizat ion 
It i s  important t o  view t h e  process of TNC expansion not only from t h e  I 
perspect ive  of TNC's and t h e  "Homew nat ions  (as most of the  l i t e r a t u r e  on I 
TNC's and d i r e c t  fore ign investment tends t o ) ,  bu t  a l s o  from t h e  viewpoint of I 
"Host" na t ions ,  l o c a l  f i rms,  and LDC's. Most t h e o r i e s  of d i r e c t  fore ign in- 
vestment and TNC expansion focus on c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of TNC's and t h e i r  "home" 
economies t o  expla in  how these  th ings  a r e  important i n  corporate expansion and 
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the  transformation of national firms i n t o  "transnation" f i r a s .  The idea t h a t  
the causes and dynamics of TNC expansion abroad a r e  t o  be located largely within 
the TNC i t s e l f  and i t s  immediate context of o l igopol i s t ic  competition i n  the  
industr ia l ized home nations is important. But it cearly neglects the  broader 
context of action i n  which such expansion takes place. These theories do not 
examine the conditions under which "Host" nations a r e  opened up t o  d i r e c t  for- 
eign investment or  open themselves up; they t e l l  us very l i t t l e  i f  anything 
about how, when, and why TNC's  penetrate given nat ional  markets overseas. 
Rather, these theories impl ic i t ly  assume -- sometimes qu i te  un jus t i f iab ly  -- 
t h a t  foreign nations '  markets may be entered a t  w i l l  and a t  any time. 
Moreover, TNC' s  a re  not merely passive actors  responding t o  given market 
demands and developments, but have a substant ia l ,  though imperfect, a b i l i t y  t o  
shape the context i n  which they operate. T N C ' s  have of ten operated i n  the con- 
t e x t  of an in te rna t iona l  "demonstration e f fec t"  which they themselves have 
p a r t i a l l y  created,  nurtured and manipulated. 
The pat terns  of consumption encouraged by TNC's  and t h e i r  e f f ec t s  on the 
in te rna t iona l  "product cycle" can often be s ta ted  with considerable specif i -  
c i t y .  I n  the case of the c iga re t t e  industry ,  what we see i s  a remarkable 
convergence of world-wide consumption trends and pat terns  towards TNC product 
forms developed i n  t h e i r  home markets. These a re  pa r t l y  the  r e s u l t  of p r io r  
TNC e f f o r t s  a t  demand creation and pa r t l y  the  r e s u l t  of the diffusion of con- 
temporary industr ia l ized nations' " l i fe -s ty les , "  f i r s t  t o  LDC e l i t e s ,  and then 
t o  broader portions of the population*. These a re  both aspects of a s ing le  
process, and consumption trends i n  the in te rna t iona l  tobacco industry over t he  
pas t  t h i r t y  years bear eloquent testimony t o  the  degree t o  which TNC' s  a re  
able to"chanie1 and bias  consumption pat terns  i n  favorable direct ions  fo r  
t h e i r  continued success and p ro f i t ab i l i t y .  In  c igare t tes ,  these have bene- 
I 
f i t t e d  U.S. TNC's  i n  par t icu la r .  
There have been four major worldwide s h i f t s  i n  the  consumption of tobacco 
products i n  the  l a s t  30 years, a l l  of them considerably influenced by TNC's: 
(1) From' a l l  o ther  tobacco products. (c igars ,  chewing pipe tobacco, e tc .  ) t o  
c igare t tes ;  ( 2 ) .  from. the  consumption of "dark" tobaccos t o  the consumption of 
" l ight"  tobaccos*; (3) from, the consumption of f i l t e r e d  c igare t tes  t o  the con- 
sumption of f i l t e r e d  cigaret tes ;  and (4) from the  consumption of shor t  (70mm) 
c igare t tes  t o  the consmption of longer c iga re t t e s  (85mm, 100mm, 120mm). 
Hence, the  trend has been strongly towards TNC product forms (e.g. longer- 
length, f i l t e r e d ,  ' 2 g h t "  tobacco c igare t tes )  and away from shorter-length, 
non-filtered "dark" tobacco products of nat ional  producers. I n  pa r t i cu l a r ,  
there has been a decis ive worldwide s h i f t  t o  the  consumption of "American 
~ BlendtP c igare t tes  (containing approximately 50-55% "flue-cured" tobaccos; I 
I 
I 30-35% burley; 10-15% "Oriental/Turkis" and 2-3% Maryland), once cul tural ly-  
spec i f ic  only t o  the  U.S. More comprehensive da ta  than it is possible t o  I 
present here c lear ly  indicate  these trends (Fidel e t .  a l .  , 1977: 3-17). For 
a long time, i n  f a c t ,  the b a t t l e  l i n e s - i n  the  Latin American c iga re t t e  indus- 
t r y  have been drawn between domestic tabaco negro c igare t tes  made by national 
firms and foreign tabaco rubio c igare t tes  made by TNC's. The "winners" a re  
c lear ly  evident i n  Table 1. 
The "Controlled" Product Cycle 
To see why pa r t i cu l a r  product forms have tended t o  give TNC's an advan- 
tage,  it i s  necessary t o  understand tha t ,  i n  the  course of attempting t o  
create  demand, TNC's have developed a vested i n t e r e s t  i n  channeling demand 
i n t o  products with which they a re  already familiar.  Rather than bother t o  
i 
ascer ta in  the consumer's ex is t ing  preferences, TNCts generally f ind it more 
prof i tab le  and e f f i c i e n t  t o  attempt t o  st imulate i n  the  consumer those 
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j u s t  p r i o r ,  during, and immediately a f t e r  TNC entry. T h i s  channeling of 
demand i n t o  the  well-worn grooves of the  TNC's product-cycle is  highly favor- 
able  t o  TNC's  and not so favorable t o  nat ional  firms, especial ly  those pro- 
ducing culturally-indigenous o r  idiosyncrat ic  product forms. 
Thus a great  dea l  of TNCs' e f f o r t s  w i l l  be directed towards making sure 
t h a t  markets abroad do converge along l i nes  already well-explored and for  
which ren ts  may be had f o r  product forms and brands already highly-depreciated 
and discounted i n  the  domestic maxket. A subs tan t ia l  amount of the TNCs' 
resources w i l l  be employed i n  the attempt t o  d i r e c t  product development and 
consumption i n  these direct ions  and t o  ensure t h a t  l oca l  "deviations" a re  not 
too diss imilar  o r  t h a t  consumption does not remain a t  a qua l i ta t ive  and/or 
quant i ta t ive  leve l  t h a t  i s  ra ther  l e s s  favorable t o  it i n  terms of appropri- 
l a b i l i t y  (Magee, 1977; Shepherd, 1981). The attempt t o  d i r e c t  consumption and 
1 production along a product-cycle path already well-explored w i l l  a c t  t o  convey 
upon TNC's  ce r ta in  systematic advantages t h a t  a re  not enjoyed by loca l  firms 
who have not already scouted these product-cycle paths t o  the degree TNC's 
have. 
There i s  no necessity t h a t  these foreign markets w i l l  proceed along the 
I 
I l inear ,  "stage" path implied by the TNCs' product-cycles. The problem from 
the TNC's point  of view is precisely  i n  making sure t h a t  foreign markets w i l l ,  
i n  fac t ,  converge along similar l ines  given the  cu l tura l ,  p o l i t i c a l ,  soc ia l  
and economic divers i tyh which reigns abroad. I n  these markets, not only are 
products l ike ly  t o  be a t  an e a r l i e r  "stage" i n  terms of product £oms mapped 
out  i n  the  home market, but they a re  a lso l ike ly  t o  be dependent on demand 
configurations which correspond t o  idiosyncratic factors  not well-known by 
TNC' s ,  a t  l e a s t  a t  the outset .  And not only w i l l  products be "different1?n 
the sense of response t o  loca l  cu l tu ra l  f a c t i r s ,  but a lso,  par t icu la r ly  i n  
LI3C1s, present i n  forms t h a t  a r e  much simpler and l e s s  approprialale by the 

f a b l e  2 
Recorded World expor ts  and Recorded World, Imports o f  C iqp re t tes  
Compared, Selected Years, 1951-1960\L) and 1967-1976\6) 
Recorded Recorded Percentage 
Year World Exports World Imports D i f f e r e n c e  
1951 126,735 106,508 16.0 
Average 
Sources: U. 5. Dept. o f  A g r i c u l t u r e ,  World Tobacco Analysis-Consumer 
Market in  , February 1958; Fore iqn  Agn icu l tu re  C i r c u l a r s  - Tobacco 
d F T  8-62, FT-3-76, FT-2-71 (Ju ly1  , 1960; May, 1962; J u l y ,  
1976 and 19771 
(1) In thousands of po;nds of c i g a r e t t s  
( 2 )  I n  m i l l i o n s  o f  c i g a r e t t e s  
( 3 )  Unfor tunate ly ,  t h e  Uni ted Sta tes  Dept. o f  A g r i c u l t u r e  discontinued pub- 
l i s h i n g  da ta  on world t rade  i n  c i g a r e t t e s  a f t e r  1962 and d i d  no t  resume i t s  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c i g a r e t t e  t rade  se r ies  u n t i l  1976 i n  ,whichD t h e  1967-1972 1 
average was provided. It may be p r e c i s e l y  because o f  t he  l a r g e  d i s p a r i t y  
between recorded exports  and recorded imports  t h a t  USDA d i  scont i  nu& t h e  
da ta  se r ies  s ince  i t  appeared so unre l  i a b l e  as t o  be worthless d u r i n g  t h e  
1960's. 
The Role of Contraband 
More importantly ,, "protectedu markets are of ten "sof tened-up" prior to 
TNC entry by contraband cigarettes. Increased smuggling of cigarettes is 
strongly associated with THC expansion:, especially that of U . S .  cigarettes is 
strongly associAted with,TNC expansion, especially that of U.S. cigarette 
firms-during the- late-1960's (Table. 23. 
sf&ificant contraband trade-in cigarettes is not only evident in Lat in  
America,. buk.in many regions and nations., including relatively developed ones 
such as I t a l y ,  B e l g i u m ,  Turkey,, etc, In the tobacco trade press there have 
been scores of articles dealing with the contraband problm since the mid- 
1960's. (See, for  example: "Former Government Aida C l a i m s  Italy Underselling 
Itself to Multinational Firms," 1975:51'; "Maylasia: smuggling Accord Reached," 
1977:66; "Philippines: Cigarettes Ga Up in Smoke," 1977:14). In Italy ,  for 
example, it was estimated that up to 200,000 Italians were earning their  l i v ing  
smuggling cigarettes, costing the government an estimated $560 m i l l i o n  a year 
in lost revenue. The practice is now. so firmly entrenched that formal protests 
are n o t  uncommon when poliem act  to curb operations {'*Italy: Smuggling on the 
Rise," 1970: 20.,. 26:). 
The pattern of smuggling is well-nigh universal, TNC cigarettes axe 
first exported from the developed countries to small, in terndiary  "free 
trade zone'"nntions (Hong mngJ Panama, Netherlands Antilles, Praguay, Lebanon., 
Malaysia, ~eS@rn/~uxembourg, Singapore, etc.1. U.S.  cigarette exports to 
these destinations E a r  ou t s t r ip  the local potential for domestic consrnnption 
by a factor of 5 .to 10, even at levels of per capita consmption characteristic . 
of the  U.S. (the highest in the world). For example', the Nekherlands Arftilles, 
w i t h  a population of 20D ,000, imported 4,126: mil l ion cigarettes f r o m  the U. S. 
-. 
in 1976. This figure equaled 20,630 cigarettes for every s ing l e  man, woman 
and child in the Netherlands, Antilles w h e n  t he  estimated annual per capita 
consumption i n  t h e  U. S. was only 2,816 i n  1975! ! 
Large q u a n t i t i e s  of these  c i g a r e t t e s  a r e  then re-exported t o  t h e i r  f i n a l  
market d e s t i n a t i o n  i n  protec ted  markets c l o s e  t o  these  (ent repot )  cen te r s  of 
i d s t r i b u t i o n .  These c i g a r e t t e s  thus  make t h e i r  way through i l l e g a l  channels I 
i n t o  surrounding p ro tec ted  markets: t h e  Netherlands A n t i l l e s  and Panama supply 
Colombia and t h e  Caribbean; Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore supply t h e  Phil-  
I i pp ines ,  Thailand and Indonesia; Paraguay supp l i e s  Braz i l  and Argentina; Leban- I I on much of t h e  Mid-East, e t c .  The d o l l a r  value of t h i s  t r a d e  is  considerable ,  
even a t  t h e  tax-f ree  and duty-free p r i c e s  repor ted  a t  e x i t  from t h e  U.S.: $50 
I mil l ion  f o r  Hong Kong; $37 mi l l ion  f o r  the  N. Ant i les ;  $18 m i l l i o n  f o r  Lebanon; I $110 mi l l ion  f o r  Belgium, t o  c i t e  a few of t h e  main smuggling c e n t e r s  (Shepherd, 
1979:Tables 33034). The a c t u a l  r e t a i l  va lue  of t h e  contraband once it reaches 
t h e  consumer is  probably about twice t h i s .  
A v a r i a t i o n  on t h e  p a t t e r n  of contraband d i s t r i b u t i o n  t akes  p lace  when 
TNC brands a r e  manufactured by l o c a l  s u b s i d i a r i e s  and/or l i censees  f o r  clandes- 
t i n e  export  
contraband i 
i n t o  neighboring markets from these  smal ler  na t ions .  Much of the  
n t o  I t a l y ,  f o r  example, comes from TNC s u b s i d i a r i e s  i n  Switzerland. 
Other cases inc lude  c i g a r e t t e s  made i n  Hong Kong, the  Canary I s l ands ,  and B e l -  
gium/Luxembourg. 
Contraband provides an e f f e c t i v e  -- i f  unorthodox and i l l e g a l  -- method of 
I 
, market pene t ra t ion  t o  gain a foothold i n  "protected" fore ign markets. The 
I i nc rease  i n  t h e  contraband c i g a r e t t e  t r a d e  of var ious  na t ions  i s  highly cor- 
r e l a t e d  wi th  t h e  b a t t l e  t o  take  over n a t i o n a l  c i g a r e t t e  i n d u s t r i e s ,  Usually 
smuggling reaches i t s  peak j u s t  p r i o r ,  during,  and a f t e r  TNC e n t r y  i n t o  a mar- 
k e t  through d i r e c t  fore ign investment o r  l icens ing.  It may extend f o r  a con- 
s i d e r a b l e  per iod  of t i m e  i f  r e s i s t a n c e  by locally-owned f irms i s  prolonged, 
bu t ,  a f t e r  TNC en t ry  and r e l a t i v e l y  complete dena t iona l i za t ion ,  smuggling f re-  
quently decl ines .  
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The case of Columbia is  i l l u s t r a t i v e  (Figure 1). Colombia is  one of the  
l a s t  wholly nationally-owned pr ivate  c iga re t t e  indus t r ies  with a f a i r l y  large 
market (above 20 b i l l i o n  c igare t tes  per annum). Until  qu i te  recently,  it a l so  
produced and consumed almost exclusively "dark tobacco" c igare t tes ,  as was 
once the norm i n  most of Latin America (Table 1). A s  contraband climbed i n  the  
ear ly  1970fs,  domestic manufacturers were hurt  and domestic output declined sig- 
n i f ican t ly .  I n  the ear ly  197OSs, two l icensing agreements were signed between 
two locally-owned firms and TNC's  t o  manufacture the two largest-sel l ing contra- 
band c igare t te  brands -- Ph i l ip  Morris' Marlboro and P. Lor i l l a rd ' s  Kent. 
T h i s ,  however, was only the f i s t  stage of the process, and smuggling 
resumed as the  domestic firms resolved t o  t r y  t o  f i g h t  out the  tabaco rubio 
vs. tobaco negro b a t t l e  (Perez Vasquez, 1975). Thus, TNC d i r e c t  foreign 
investment has ye t  t o  be accomplished and contraband continues a t  high levels  
i n  Colombia -- approximately 4.5 b i l l i o n  c iga re t t e s  a year (Republics de 
Colombia, DNP, 1975:6; Perez Vasquez, 1975). To gain some idea of the  s ize  of 
t h i s  t rade i n  i l l i c i t  c iga re t t e s ,  it was nearly as large a s  U. S. exports 
of c igare t tes  t o  the EEC i n  the ear ly  1970's (approximately 5.7 b i l l i o n )  . The 
magnitude of contraband enter ing Colombia made it larger  than the t o t a l  1975 
c iga re t t e  exports of e i t he r  the  American Tobacco Co. o r  Liggett & Myers, 
roughly one-half those of P. Loril lard;  31% of a l l  exports of R. J. Reynolds, 
and 29% of those of Ph i l i p  Morris (Shepherd, 1981). A t  ear ly  1970's p r ices ,  
this clandestine t rade was worth i n  the neighborhood of 40-50 mill ion dol lars .  
4 
The e n t i r e  process i s  revealed perhaps most c lear ly  by the Argentine ex- 
perience. Smuggling of c igare t tes  skyrocketed i n  the  ear ly  1960's (Figure 2 ) ,  , 
I t  then f e l l  off  momentarily i n  1962 when lega l  imports were b r i e f ly  permitted 
(with low dut ies )  t o  combat the  problem. T h i s  d id  not provjde domestic firms 
with any resp i te ,  but only made t h e i r  s i t ua t ion  worse because e f fec t ive  pro- 
tec t ion  had been l i f t e d  (as a lso took place i n  Colombia). To defend themselves, 
some na t iona l  f irms began t o  e s t a b l i s h  themselves as  exclusive importers of 
TNC's  brands, thus beginning dependence on t h e  TNC1s, When l e g a l  imports were 
once again shu t  o f f ,  l i cens ing  arrangements were es tab l i shed  f o r  l o c a l  manu- 
fac tu re  of brands t h a t  had previously been imported. Quickly t h e r e a f t e r ,  i n  
d i r e  f i n a n c i a l  s t r a i t s ,  a l l  t h e  nationally-owned f irms were acquired a t  bargain 
4 
p r i c e s  by TNC1s ( P h i l i p  Morris-Massalin & Celasco; Liggett  & Myers-Piccardo; 
Reemstma-Particulares and Imparciales)  i n  1966-67. This completed t h e  denation- 
a l i z a t i o n  process. After  the  period of establishment of TNC brands, smuggling 
f e l l  o f f  r ap id ly  back t o  "normal," pre-1960 (unorganized?) l e v e l s  (Figure @ I .  
Where were na t iona l  governments i n  a l l  t h i s ,  given t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s  a s  
"senior pa r tne r s"  i n  t h e  c i g a r e t t e  indust ry  through excise  t a x  r e c e i p t s ?  One 
study i n  Argentina est imated t h a t  some $28 mi l l ion  d o l l a r s  were l o s t  i n  
government revenue, and the re  was a balance of payments l o s s  of $54 mi l l ion  
i n  payments f o r  contraband c i g a r e t t e s  between 1961-67, a f t e r  deducting 35% 
t o  the  smugglers who (presumably?) were Argentines (ORIC, 1968: Anexo V: 5; 28) . 
I n  f a c t ,  publ ic  po l i cy  towards t h e  indust ry  i n  both Colombia and Argentina (as 
w e l l  a s  many o the r  Latin American nat ions)  w a s  extremely contradictory.  I t  
o f ten  made th ings  worse f o r  na t iona l  f irms even when governmental i n t e n t  was 
otherwise. 
It i s  t r u l y  remarkable how s i m i l a r  the  bas ic  o u t l i n e s  of t h i s  whole pro- 
cess  has been -- inc luding Latin American governments' responses t o  these  
events, The p o l i t i c a l  w i l l  t o  take decis ive  ac t ion  on behalf of na t iona l  f irms 
was not forthcoming, and po l i cy  tended t o  v a c i l l a t e  among var ious  a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  
none of them providing any r e a l  so lu t ion  t o  the  problem. Governments were 
t o t a l l y  incapable of e rad ica t ing  p o l i t i c a d  corruption and/or incompetence i n  
customs enforcement and i n  o ther  c r u c i a l  s e c t o r s  of pub l i c  adminis t ra t ion  such 
a s  t h e  mi l i t a ry .  Although governments were los ing  untold mi l l ions  of d o l l a r s  
i n  t a x  revenues, adver t i s ing  f o r  TNC brands t h a t  could only e n t e r  t h e  countr ies  
1 i l l e g a l l y  was b l a t a n t l y  apparent along pub l ic  thoroughfares and i n  t h e  mass media 
i n  both Colombia and Argentina (Perez Vasquez, 1975:31; Vi las ,  1974:12). Gov- 
ernment technocra ts ,  reasoning on neo-c lass ica l  economic grounds t h a t  l e g a l  
imports wi th  f a i r l y  low t a r i f f s  would c u t  smuggling and recoup government 
revenues, experimented temporari ly wi th  l i f t i n g  import bans and high t a r i f f s  
on fo re ign  c i g a r e t t e s  only t o  f i n d  t h a t ,  w h i l e  government revenue d id  recover 
somewhat, this served t o  consol idate ,  l eg i t imize  and expand TNC products '  
p o s i t i o n s  i n  t h e  market. Since t h i s  d i d  nothing t o  r e l i v e  TNC pressures  on 
nationally-owned f irms,  t h e  l a t t e r  vehemently p ro tes ted ,  not without  reason,  
t h a t  they had w i l l i n g l y  borne t h e  brunt  of high t axa t ion  on t h e i r  products t o  
help support t h e  government and were the re fo re  e n t i t l e d  t o  some support  them- 
se lves .  I n  f a c t ,  dur ing per iods  of l e g a l  imports,  t h e  e f f e c t i v e  r a t e  of tax- 
a t i o n  on nationally-owned f i rms '  products was a c t u a l l y  much higher than t h a t  
levied  on t h e  TNC imported brands (Perez Vasquez, 1975:5-20). Thus, temporary 
per iods  of l e g a l  imports a l t e rna ted  wi th  increased smuggling when import bans 
and high t a r i f f s  were reimposed u n t i l  na t iona l  f irms were s u f f i c i e n t l y  finan- 
c i a l l y  cr ippled t o  e i t h e r  se l l  ou t  t o  T N C ' s  o r ,  a t  t h e  minimum, s ign  l i c e n s i n g  
agreements f o r  t h e  l o c a l  manufacture of the  contraband TNC brands. 3 
Another f a c t o r  i n  t h e  v a c i l l a t i o n  of pub l i c  po l i cy  appears t o  have been 
t h e  protec ted  s t a t u s  and quasi-monopolistic pos i t ions  na t iona l  f i rms had long 
held i n  t h e i r  markets. Because of t h e  long h i s t o r y  of dominance and f a i r l y  
s i g n i f i c a n t  p o l i t i c a l  and economic power of these  f i rms,  lower sec to r s  of t h e  
pub l ic  adminis t ra t ion  (and some of t h e  higher o f f i c i a l s  a s  w e l l )  were not  
about t o  shed many t e a r s  over t h e i r  p l igh t .  Nationally-owned f irms were some- * 
t i m e s  able  t o  f i n a l l y  g e t  t h e i r  way, but  it o f t e n  took herculean pushing and 
shoving i n  l e g i s l a t u r e s  and t h e  re levan t  bureaucracies. By t h a t  t i m e  it was 
oEtdn too l a t e .  Even when support  was forthcoming, governmental ac t ion  was 
taken no t  ou t  of any g r e a t  sympathy f o r  the  p l i g h t  of nationally-owned f irms,  
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but ra ther  out of concern for  the e f f ec t s  on the economy as  a whole and on t ax  
revenues. Interviews with Latin American policy-makers confirm t h a t  many 
viewed national c iga re t t e  firms as predatory, oppressive monopolists f i na l ly  
1 %  get t ing a t a s t e  of t h e i r  own medicine. Thus, they t a c i t l y  encouraged TNC I competition, l ega l  o r  i l l e g a l  (Shepherd, 1981). 
Thus, smuggling pat terns  strongly suggest t h a t  contraband bas been an 
arm of TNC "marketing" e f f o r t s  t o  penetrate foreign c igare t te  industr ies .  4 
The benef i ts  of smuggling go considerably beyond the simple des i re  t o  export 
I more c igare t tes  wherever and however they can. Contraband TNC c igare t tes  
"soften-up" prospective markets abroad for  l icensing and subsidiary operations 
l a t e r  on by creat ing a demand f o r  ce r t a in  product forms and brands; by subtle- 
ly  changing consumer t a s t e s  through snob appeal and lower pr ices  (smuggled 
c igare t tes  pay nei ther  excise taxes nor import d u t i e s ) ;  and, they cr ipple  the 
loca l  competition which, i f  nationally-owned and r e l a t i ve ly  weak f inanc ia l ly ,  
can then be ea s i ly  acquired. I f  TNC's a r e  l icensing t h e i r  brands t o  loca l  
manufacturers, smuggling can a l so  be employed t o  press  for  equity participa- 
t ion.  I f  l ega l  imports a re  temporarily permitted t o  combat smuggling, T N C ' s  
can switch t o  lega l  exports, contraband w i l l  s t i l l  continue somewhat (because 
contraband pays nei ther  excise taxes nor import d u t i e s ) ,  and, i n  any event, 
nationally-owned firms . w i l l  s t i l l  be hurt .  
The smuggling problem i n  i t s  en t i r e ty  is simply too complex t o  be consid- 
ered i n  any d e t a i l  here (Shepherd, 1977:19-21; Shepherd, 1981). The exact 
nature of i t s  causes and a l l  i ts  dimensions are  not su f f i c i en t ly  clear.  A good 
1 
ttneo-classical" economist would point t o  r e l a t i ve ly  high taxes. high t a r i f f s ,  
and outr ight  prohibit ions on imports as the  main sources of d i f f i c u l t y  
(Bhagwati, 1974). These a re  undoubtedly p a r t  of the problem. But the  f a c t  
I 
t h a t  contraband sometimes flourishes even where smuggled c igare t tes  are  con- 
siderably - more expensive than loca l  products suggests t h a t  t r ad i t i ona l  economic 
planation. Because of the r e l a t i ve ly  large numbers of people involved i n  con- I I traband d i s t r i bu t ion  networks and the r i s k  involved, margins on smuggled cigar- I 
e t t e s  tend t o  be ra ther  high. So pr ice  d i f f e r en t i a l s ,  i n  and of themselves, 
a re  not always t h a t  great  o r  even non-existent. They a re  cer ta in ly  insuf f i -  
c i en t  as  a complete account of the problem, ignoring as  they do the  rold of 
TNC's i n  influencing consumer choice. Other variables a r e  c lear ly  involved 
. 
since many, i f  not most, LDC nations have IS1 protectionism and high excise 
taxes. But only ce r t a in  nations a t  ce r ta in  times have had ser ious  nat ional  
smuggling problems with c igaret tes .  For example, I t a l y '  s s t a t e  monopoly has 
ser ious  problems but Japan's does not. Thus, contraband, as  a general phen- 
omenon, may be as closely re la ted  t o  TNC s t r a t eg i e s  and soc iopol i t i ca l  variables 
as t o  more narrowly economic ones (Shepherd, 1977: 2 1) . 
The ro le  of TNC' s  i n  contraband a l so  needs c l a r i f i ca t ion .  Smuggling has 
been an e f fec t ive  instrument of TNC market penetration i n  the  c iga re t t e  indus- 
t r y  regardless of the precise  ro le  of TNC's i n  contraband a c t i v i t i e s .  Whether 
T N C ' s  have been d i r ec t ly  involved i n  the t rade,  whether they have ind i rec t ly  
encouraged it, or  whether they have had no connection with smuggling a c t i v i t i e s  
whatsoever, TNC's have been the  primary benef ic iar ies  of contraband i n  cigar- 
e t t e s  i n  Latin America (and probably elsewhere as wel l ) .  There is a t  l e a s t  
some (unfortunately confidentai l )  evidence of d i r e c t  TNC involvement i n  smuggling 
i n  both Argentina and Colombia. There i s  also considerable circumstkntial  
evidence implied i n  the  basic ou t l ines  of these massive "marketing" campaigns 
through smuggling: the b la tan t  advertisement of TNC brands t h a t  can only be 
brought i n t o  a nation and bought there  through i l l e g a l  channels; the consider- 
able f inanc ia l  dimensions of a l te rna t ive  contraband d i s t r i bu t ion  networks; the  
rap id i ty  with which they appear and disappear; the  timing of contraband "phases" 
i n  d i f f e r en t  nations; the  f a c t  tha t ,  while a var ie ty  of c iga re t t e  brands i s  
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ava i l ab le  i n  contraband markets, c e r t a i n  brands (usual ly  only two o r  t h r e e )  
I a r e  much widely d i s t r i b u t e d  and f a r  o u t s e l l  a l l  o the r s ;  the  f a c t  t h a t  it i s  
p rec i se ly  the  manufacturers of these  same brands t h a t  e n t e r  through l i cens ing  
o r  d i r e c t  fore ign investment l a t e r  on; and t h e  f a c t  t h a t  any se l f - respec t ing  
"marketing" personnel i n  charge of c i g a r e t t e  expor ts  i n  given regions would 
t have t o  be b l ind  not  t o  r e a l i z e  where massive exports  t o  countr ies  l i k e  t h e  
Netherland Ant i l l e s  f i n a l l y  end up. 
Impact on I n d u s t r i a l  Structure:  Foreign Dominance and Concentration 
The process of denat ional iza t ion has l a rge ly  e n t a i l e d  t h e  expansion of 
U.S. TNC's i n t o  t h e  region s ince  most of t h e  BAT subs id ia r i e s  were es tab l i shed  
much e a r l i e r .  But it is not  exclus ively  a U, S. TNC process -- e i t h e r  i n  o r i g i n  
o r  i n  benef i t s .  The West German firm Reemstma acquired two of t h e  Argentine 
na t iona l  f i rms,  f o r  example. And BAT may be t h e  eventual  benef ic iary  i n  
Colombia s ince  it has now assumed P. L o r i l l a r d ' s  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  operat ions.  6 
One should a l s o  emphasize t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a p a t t e r n  here. The same s e r i e s  
of events -- with  some v a r i a t i o n  i n  the  p a t t e r n  and t iming -- have a l s o  taken 
p lace  i n  Braz i l  (1970's) ;  Mexico (1960 's ) ;  Peru (1960's) ;  and Ecuador (1970's) 
as  w e l l  a s  i n  many o the r  smaller  markets i n  Latin America. Only Venezuela, 
~ 
Chile, Uruguay, and Cuba have exhibi ted  major d i f ferences .  Venezuela l a rge ly  
I escaped a major contraband a s s a u l t  because i t s  o i l  wealth made it t h e  l a r g e s t  
~ 
( l ega l )  importer of U,S. c i g a r e t t e s  i n  t h e  1950's. U.S. TNC's es tab l i shed  a 
foothold i n  t h e  market this way q u i t e  ear ly .  This l ed  t o  r e l a t i v e l y  &rly 
denat ional iza t ion a t  t h e  o u t s e t  of the formation of Venezuela's c i g a r e t t e  
indus t ry  i n  t h e  l a t e  1950's and e a r l y  1060's. C h i l e  seems t o  have deviated 
from the  p a t t e r n  somewhat because of the  p r i v a t e ,  of f ic ia l ly-sanct ioned 
monopoly held by t h e  l o c a t  BAT subsidiary  the re ,  A small  market and depressed 
economic condit ions a l l  dur ing the  1970's ev iden ta l ly  made it u n a t t r a c t i v e  
f o r  o the r  TNC ' s  although P h i l i p  Morris r ecen t ly  entered i n  1982. The case of 
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Uruguay, which retained the only t o t a l l y  nationally-owned industry (without 
even l icensing with THC's) u n t i l  recently,  is  not en t i r e ly  c lear .  Depressed 
economic conditions there  may have played some ro l e  as well  a s  the  disturbed 
p o l i t i c a l  conditions charac te r i s t ic  of t he  l a t e  1960's and ea r ly  1970fs, 
However, Ph i l i p  Morris has acquired a locally-owned firm there  and Uruguay may 
d i f f e r  over the long-run only i n  the  r e l a t i ve  tardiness  of the  denationalization 
process ("Philip Morris Invests i n  Uruguayan Firmp " 197 9: 24) , 
"Denationalization" i s  an apt  term f o r  the  process of TNC entry i n t o  t he  
%t in  American c igare t te  industry over the  pas t  35 years because it took place 
largely through the  acquis i t ion of ex is t ing  nationally-owned firms. Nearly 
80% of the  traceable U.S. TNC subsidiary operations i n  Latin America were 
acquisit ions of t h i s  type (Shepherd, 1981). The complex reasons fo r  this can 
not be explored here, but several  factors  were a t  work i n  addit ion t o  the 
deb i l i t a t i ng  e f f ec t s  of contraband on national firms: (1) the  pressure of 
domestic market stagnation dicta ted rapid entry i n t o  foreign ma2kets while the  I 
large cash flow from domestic s a l e s  provided t h e  necessary funds; ( 2 )  THC 
c iga re t t e  firms' demand creat ion advantages logical ly  implied a s t ra tegy of 
acquis i t ion t o  obtain some loca l  marketing expertise,  an easy entry i n t o  pre- 
ex is t ing  d i s t r ibu t ion  systems abroad, and a "national" cloak" with which t o  
def lec t  possible na t iona l i s t  consumer re jec t ion  and "pol i t i ca l"  react ion t o  
aggressive competition based on " a r t j f i c i a l r t t  "unfair" demand creat ion tech- 
niques (Shepherd, 1977: 14-15] . 
I 
The process of denationalization has been most aggressively pressed 
towards complete take-over i n  the  la rges t ,  most a t t r a c t i v e  markets with con- J 
siderable growth poten t ia l ,  such as Mexico, Argentina, Brazil  and Venezuela, 
I n  many of the  smaller, more sluggish markets, TNC's have been content with 
l icensing arrangements o r  with p a r t i a l  take-overs and minority equity posi t ions  
a t  present, a s  i n  Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay, e tc .  Nevertheless, TNC market 
con t ro l  i n  Latin America i s  q u i t e  high (Table 3 ) ,  
The d a t a  a r e  r e a l l y  r a t h e r  s t r i k i n g :  TNC's  a r e  p resen t  i n  one form o r  
another i n  every s i n g l e  na t iona l  market i n  t h e  region and they a r e  t h e  dominating 
f a c t o r  i n  most. Their market shares  a r e  q u i t e  l a rge ,  giving them v i r t u a l  con- 
& 
t r o l  of most of t h e  major Eatin American c i g a r e t t e  i n d u s t r i e s .  I n  t h e  l a r g e r  
Y na t iona l  markets of Braz i l ,  Argentina, Mexico, Venezuela and Chile t h e i r  dom- 
inance is  obvious; but  one should a l s o  note t h e  degree of pene t ra t ion  of some 
of t h e  smaller  na t ions  such a s  Ecuador, t h e  Centra l  American countr ies ,  and the  
Caribbean nations.  I n  e f f e c t ,  nationally-owned tobacco i n d u s t r i e s  survive i n  
only very few nat ions  -- Uruguay, Peru, Colombia, and perhaps one o r  two more. 
Even these  a r e  t i e d  t o  t h e  TNC's by l i cens ing  arrangements and TNC inf luence  
is  p l a i n l y  on t h e  rise. Perhaps t h e  most d i s q u i e t i n g  th ing  about Table 3 i s  
t h a t ,  were it poss ib le  t o  assemble t h e  same s o r t  of information f o r ,  say,  1950 
o r  even 1960, it would look very d i f f e r e n t .  Apart from most of t h e  BAT opera- 
t i o n s  (and even t h e  BAT market con t ro l  was o f t en  lower) ,  Lat in  American c igar-  
e t t e  i n d u s t r i e s  were wholly na t iona l  i n  ownership i n  1950 o r  1960. By t h e  mid- 
19701s, however, nationally-owned c i g a r e t t e  f irms had become a t h i n g  of t h e  
p a s t .  
After  TNC e n t r y ,  a r a d i c a l  transformation of t h e  contours of the  indust ry  
has f requent ly  taken place.  After  acqu i s i t ion  of l o c a l  f i rms (or  even, on oc- 
ca t ion ,  a f t e r  l i cens ing  begings) ,  a p a r t i c u l a r  p a t t e r n  has tended t o  emerge, es- 
p e c i a l l y  i n  t h e  l a r g e r  markets l i k e  Braz i l ,  Argentina, and Mexico wher'e de- 
'L na t iona l i za t ion  was almost t o t a l .  In tense  o l i g o p o l i s t i c  competition f o r  a 
l a r g e r  market share  immediately broke ou t  -- which d id  not  usua l ly  involve much 
C 
durable p r i c e  competition. There was a r a t h e r  s h o r t  (5-year) cycle  of in tense ,  
more evenly-divided competition i n  terms of market shares,  followed by'consider-  
ab le  market shake-up (firms wi th  i n i t i a l l y  l a r g e  market shares  declined and v i c e  
v e r s a ) ,  and then renewed concentrat ion and consolidat ion.  The Argentine exper- 
ience a f t e r  1966 may be a paradigm case of this pa t te rn  (Fidel e t  a1. 1977:Zl-39). 
While there  are  a number of fac tors  a t  work making for  high levels  of 
market concentration i n  Latin American c iga re t t e  industr ies ,  not a11 of them 
d i r ec t ly  traceable t o  the impact of TNC's ,  TNC entry has done nothing t o  re- 
*, 
verse these,  and, on the  contrary,  has served t o  accentuate and accelerate  high 
levels  of concentration. Thus, although nationally-owned c iga re t t e  indus t r ies  a 
have operated i n  conditions of t i g h t  oligopoly o r  quasi-monopoly h i s to r i ca l ly ,  
the  entry of TNC's has fur ther  concentrated market s t ructure .  For example, 
p r io r  t o  TNC entry i n  Argentina i n  t he  mid-1960fs, there  had been 5-7 major 
f i m s .  Led by BAT'S subsidiary with approximately 35-40% of the  market, f o r  
decades the r e s t  a£ the  market had been r e l a t i ve ly  evenly-divided among local- 
ly-owned firms. After a shor t  period of intense o l igopol i s t ic  r iva l ry  f01l.o~- 
ing  TNC take-oveks, however, successive mergess have now reduced the  industry 
t o  only - two f i m s ,  a duopoly i n  the  hands of BAT and Phklip Morris, This 
t r ans i t i on  from loose oligopoly t o  "workable cornpetiton" and then t o  renewed 
concentration and consolidation under TNC's has a l so  taken place i n  other  
I 
Latin American markets, including Brazil ,  Mexico and Venezuela. 
TNC Expansion of Demand 
*After TNC entry,  the market was often 'Ettzrned around" towards very rapid 
growth r a t e s  both i n  terms of t o t a l  output and per  cap i ta  consumption. This 
was usually i n  great  contras t  t o  the r e l a t i ve ly  stagnant aggregate market 
growth r a t e s  real ized by nationally-owned firms (Table 5 ) .  The primary method 
by which t h i s  has been accomplished is a vas t  increase i n  demand creat ion ef- a 
f o r t s ,  primarily advertising,  but a l so  through ra t iona l iza t ion  of d i s t r i bu t ion  
4 
systems, increased sa l e s  forces,  and other  promotional techniques* 7 
In Argentina, f o r  example, there was a dramatic upsurge i n  advert is ing ex- 
penditures af t o r  1966 (Table 6 )  . Once the industry "shake-up" had taken place. 
new brands launched, and old ones repositioned o r  eliminated, advertis"ing and 
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Table 6 
C i q a r e t t e  A d v e r t i s i n g  Expenditures i n  Argent ina Before and 
A f t e r  En t r y  of Transnat ional  C iga re t te  Firms, 1958-1 976 
Source: J u l i o  F i d e l  and Jorge Lucangelii, "Cost-Benefi t  o f  D i f f e r e n t  Techno- 
l og ica l  Options i n  t h e  Context of a D i f f e ren t i a ted  #01 igopo ly :  The 
Case of t h e  Argent ine  C i g a r e t t e  Industry , "  Uni ted Nat ions Economic 
Commission f o r  L a t i n  America and inter-American Development Bank I 
Research Program i n  Science and Technology, Working Paper No. 18, 
Buenos A i res ,  October, 1978, Table 5 ,  p. 18. 
(1) Defl r t e d  by t he  "on-rura l  wholesale p r i c e  index. 
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other promotional expenditures declined i n  the 1970's. The increasingly 
dysfunctional advertising war led t o  a "truce" i n  the £om of a voluntary 
agreement t o  ban advertising i n  radio, TV and movie theaters  between Sepqember, 
1969 and July 1971, r a t i f i e d  by the Argentine government (Pidel and Lucangeli, 
1978: E l )  . Highly-in£ la t ionary conditions coupled with governmental p r ice  con- 
t r o l s  caused a decline i n  the r e a l  p r ice  of c igare t tes  t o  consumers which aided 
i n  the  e f f o r t  t o  increase consumption, and st imulate market growth. But, i n  the  
context of an advertising war, this was a mixed bless ing since it also ser iously 
affected p r o f i t  levels.  Hence, the  advertising ban and the new, more s e t t l e d  
equilibrium which evolved i n  the  mid-17~0's (Table 6 ) .  
TNC brand s t r a t eg i e s  a f t e r  denationalization i n  markets l i ke  Argentina, 
Brazi l ,  and Mexico, a l so  demonstrate the  often-tenuous nature of the advantage 
TNC1s obtained over nationally-owned firms, the f u l l  significance of both the 
contraband phase, and the ro l e  of acquis i t ion of national firms. Nationally- 
owned firms were not simply decisively defeated i n  a r e l a t i ve ly  open, " f a i r "  
game of commercial combat with TNC's. Often enough, nationally-owned firms 
were well-established, and t h e i r  brands had accumulated a large stock of "good- 
wil l"  and market appeal. Most nationally-owned firms put up credible opposi- 
t i on  t o  the  entry of T N C ' s ,  both commercially and po l i t i ca l ly .  They did not 
simply "cave in" o r  sell  out a t  the f i r s t  h in t  of foreign competition. With- 
out the deb i l i t a t i ng  e f f ec t s  of contraband and governmental vac i l la t ion ,  
nationally-owned firms probably could have survived i n  many markets i n  Latin 
America. 
Shortly a f t e r  TNC entry and the acquisit ion of nationally-owned firms, 
there was usually a s ign i f ican t  degree of demand creation emphasis placed on 
the  TNCs' " international" (read home market) brands, such as Marlboro, Kent, 
Winston, etc.  T h i s  was t o  gain market acceptance of locally-made versions of 
the  "international" brands formerly made available through smuggling. Over 
the  longer-run, however, these."internationalw brands play a somewhat l e s s  
important ro l e  i n  subsidiary operations. National brands which were developed 
by loca l  firms before TNC entry have normally comprised a large, often major, 
portion of TNC' s subsidiar ies  ' sales.  l0 Although Marlboro alone accounted fo r  
more than one-third of Ph i l i p  Morris' in te rna t iona l  s a l e s  (including expor t s ) ,  
about 60% of i t s  volume abroad was i n  regional and nat ional  brands i n  1976 
(PhiLig Morris, Inc. , 1976: 6) . 
The continued populari ty of nat ional  brands fo r  the majority of consumers 
suggests t h a t  TNC footholds i n  t he  market with in te rna t iona l  brands during the 
contraband stage were actual ly  ra ther  f r ag i l e  and did not r ea l ly  provide the 
basis  f o r  long-term success i n  the market. Hence, acquisit ion of nat ional  
firms' brands played a cen t r a l  ro l e  i n  TNC success. I n  the absence of the  
"unique" conditions of massive smuggling, public policy vac i l la t ion  and so 
fo r th ,  nationally-owned firms probably could have been viable enterpr ises .  
Indeed, they had been qui te  successful  for  long periods of t i m e  i n  may Latin 
American markets p r io r  t o  TNC assaul t .  
Evaluation of the  Performance of the  Internat ional  Cigarette 
Oligopoly i n  LDC ' s 
Focusing largely on Latin America -- but a lso on LDC's generally, t h i s  sec- 
t i on  attempts a br ie f  overview of TNC c iga re t t e  firms, ago - indus t r i a l  perform- 
ance i n  a var ie ty  of areas: pr ic ing behavior, p r o f i t a b i l i t y ,  technology and em- 
ployment, t rade and balance of payments, linkage e f f ec t s  and income dis t r ibu-  
ir 
t ion.  I n  addition, I w i l l  focus on two broad areas of TNC impact on LDC's 
which appear par t icu la r ly  problematic: (1) questions of basic human needs and 
product appropriateness, including the  smoking/health issue; and ( 2 )  questions 
of cu l tu ra l  imperialism and dependence. 
Pricing Behavior. Because of the high levels  of concentration manifested 
i n  the  in te rna t iona l  c iga re t t e  industry durable pr ice  competition would seem 
q u i t e  unlikely.  Both t h e  p a s t  h i s t o r y  'of t h e  indus t ry  and theory suggest t h a t  
non-price competition through demand c rea t ion  techniques l i k e  adver t i s ing  and 
product form v a r i a t i o n  would be much more common. Administered p r i c e s  and 
o l i g o p o l i s t i c  p r i c e  leadership  p a t t e r n s  do, i n  f a c t ,  cha rac te r i ze  many over- 
seas  c i g a r e t t e  markets i n  both TNC- and non-TNC-dominated markets. But TNC's 
have an independent impact on p r i c i n g  which ev iden ta l ly  functions i n  addi t ion  t o  
nat ional - level  market power and concentrat ion p e r  se. This deserves f a r  
I grea te r  a t t e n t i o n  than it i s  poss ib le  t o  give it here. 
It is i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  see  what happens t o  p r i c e s  i n  LDC markets when TNC's  
take  over l o c a l  o l igopo l i s t s .  As one example, no t i ce  the  p r i c i n g  changes t h a t  
took place  i n  Argentina a f t e r  t h e  acqu i s i t ion  of l o c a l  f i rms i n  1966 (Table 7 ) .  
d 
This i s  a "conservative" comparison because the  Argentine market has long been 
o l i g o p o l i s t i c  and BAT has had a s t rong  market p o s i t i o n  t h e r e  s ince  WW I. BAT, 
i n  f a c t ,  bought ou t  two of t h e  then-exist ing s i x  na t iona l  f irms i n  1961. 
Nevertheless, t h e  complete denat ional iza t ion of t h e  indus t ry  i n  1966 had a 
profound e f f e c t  on p r ices .  Whereas the  r e a l  average p r i c e  of a  pack of cigar-  
e t t e s  was 12.0 pesos i n  the  f i v e  years (1961-65) preceding t h e  e n t r y  of o ther  
TNC firms i n  1966, i n  t h e  f i v e  years following 1966 (1967-71), t h e  p r i c e  
jumped t o  an average of 15.5 pesos -- a 23% increase.  It was not u n t i l  s t r i c t e r  
p r i c e  con t ro l s  were imposed by t h e  Peron government i n  1972 t h a t  t h e  r e a l  p r i c e  
I declined back t o  pre-1966 levels .  
These p r i c e  hikes r e f l e c t e d  t h e  i n i t i a l  e f f o r t s  of t h e  TNC firms t o  main- 
L t a i n  o r  increase  o l i g o p o l i s t i c  p r o f i t  margins i n  t h e  face of heightened non- 
p r i c e  r i v a l r y ,  e spec ia l ly  the  v a s t  inc rease  i n  adver t i s ing  (Table 6 )  and the  
~ 
launching of new, more-expensYve product forms and brands. With increased 
~ c o s t s  and s t r i c t e r  p r i c e  controls ,  TNC's  were eventual ly  unsuccessful a t  main- 
i 
~ 
t a i n i n g  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  (Fidel  and Lucangeli , 1978: 14-21) . A c l o s e r  look a t  
1 p r i c e s  wi th in  given product forms reveals  some minor p r i c e  shading over t h e  
Tab le  7 
and Average Real P r f  ce per Pack o f  2 0 ,  1950-74 
Sales  
( m i  1 1 ions  o f  packs) 
Average Real Price/Pack 
(1960 Pesos)* 
1955 1,047 13,3 
1956 1,068 12.7 
1957 1,097 12.0 
1958 1,118 10.9 
1959 1,167 9 ,2  
1960 1,082 12.1 
1961 1,161 12.9 
1962 1,174 11,6 
1963 1,185 12.0 
1964 1,256 11.0 
1965 1,248 E n t r y  of  TNC 12.7 
1968 1,307 16.6 
1969 1,376 16.3 
1970 1,467 14.7 
1971 1,509 14.2 
1972 1,595 12.2 
1973 1,676 12.0 
1974 1,891 11.9 ' 
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period 1967-76 for  new brand launches and brand "repositioning," but l i t t l e  
t rue  pr ice  competition over the longer-run, What p r i ce  competition there  was 
seems as much the r e s u l t  of p r ice  control  changes and rapid in f l a t i on  as af 
TNC policy. Price i den t i t y  did  not always obtain within product categories 
and pr ice  controls ,  extremely rapid in f l a t i on ,  new brand launches and the over- 
a l l  s h i f t  towards higher-priced products. Price changes were sometimes so 
e r r a t i c  and rapid they l e f t  consumers bewildered. These conditions make the 
Argentine experience somewhat atypical .  In  markets l i k e  Venezuela, Mexico and 
Peru, where more s t ab l e  macro-economic conditions prevailed, p r ic ing  by TNC's 
or  t h e i r  l icensees showed more evidence of typ ica l  o l igopol i s t ic  p r ice  r i g id i ty .  
Perhaps the most s ign i f ican t  independent impact of TNC1s on pr ic ing behavior 
has been the overa l l  s h i f t  towards "sophisticated," more e~pensive~higher-margin 
product forms and brands. This i s  especially t rue  with regard t o  the in t ro-  
duction of "international" brands l i k e  Marlboro, Kent, Winston, Pa l l  Mall, e tc .  
c 
Orthodox oligopoly theory predicts  this behavior i n  markets dominated by a few 
large TNC's (Kaldor, 1949). For example, a 1976 survey of r e t a i l  c iga re t t e  
pr ices  i n  36 cap i t a l  c i t i e s  around the world found the "international" brand 
Marlboro priced higher (and sometimes considerably more so)  than the largest-  
s e l l i n g  nat ional  brand i n  a l l  but 7 c i t i e s .  I n  only one (Brussels), was it 
lower i n  price.  Of the 10 LDC cap i t a l s  surveyed, Marlboro was priced higher 
~ 
i n  a l l  but one (Bueons Aires),  where it was the same pr ice  (UNCTAD, 1978:Table 
23, p. 76). Di f fe ren t ia l  taxation may account f o r  some of these differences,  
4 
but the basic pa t te rn  of higher pr ices  would l i ke ly  remain even i f  taxes were 
, 
factored out. 
In addit ion,  we cannot be sure whether most LDC consumers may i n  f a c t  want 
a l l  the "consumer welfare" embodied i n  high-priced, higher-quality, "connoisseur 
goods" l i ke  TNC c igaret tes .  A s  Helleiner suggests, Lancaster's "consumption 
1 technology" theory might be used t o  see  i f  consumers i n  LDC's consume ef f ic ien t -  
I 
I 
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l y  when they buy TNC products (Helleiner, 1975 rl72-86) ; Lancaster , 1975) . Any 
product contains a bundle of i den t i f i ab l e  charac te r i s t ics .  TNC's produce cigar- 
e t t e s  t h a t  change the shape of and s h i f t  the "consumption f ron t ie r"  curve t o  the  
r i gh t ,  e. g. they o f f e r  products with more "luxurioust' charac te r i s t ics  l i k e  
fancy packaging, s o c i a l  p res t ige ,  in te rna t iona l  baand names,ietc. which a re  
a l so  higher i n  pr ice ,  This forces lower-income smokers, who may only value "es- 
sencial" charac te r i s t ics  l i ke  smooth smoking qual i ty ,  basic packging t o  keep the 
tobacco fresh,  the simple convenience of ready-made c iga re t t e s  over roll-your-own 
c igare t tes ,  e tc .  t o  buy more luxurious charac te r i s t ics  than they otherwise would 
i f  they could obtain the  "essent ia l"  features  separately. Given the  scarc i ty  -- 
or  disappearance altogether -- of cheaper, more basic product forms a f t e r  TNC 
entry i n  many markets i n  Latin America, t h i s  seems qui te  l i ke ly  t o  have been 
the case. Moreover, fo r  consumers who value indigenous product forms a s  "es- 
sen t ia l "  charac te r i s t ics  i n  the sense of reaffirming t h e i r  cu l tu ra l  iden t i fy ,  
the s h i f t  t o  "foreign" product forms a l so  deprives them of an e s sen t i a l  char- 
a c t e r i s t i c ,  replacing it with luxurious ones they may not wish. Thus, these 
consumer groups may be forced t o  consume " inef f ic ien t ly . "  
P ro f i t ab i l i t y ,  High leve ls  of concentration and o l igopol i s t ic  p r ic ing  
s t r a t eg i e s  imply excess p r o f i t s  over and above a competitive p r o f i t  r a t e  
equilibrium. Despite generally higher costs  of demand creation and higher 
qua l i ty  products, it seems probably t h a t  TNC c iga re t t e  firms' p r o f i t a b i l i t y  i s  
usually well  above ordinary indus t r i a l  levels.  Extraordinary curcumstances i 
aside -- such as  the pr ice  control / inf la t ionary squeeze i n  Argentina -- TNC's  have 
normally earned o l igopol i s t ic  p ro f i t s .  T h i s  is  par t icu la r ly  important for  
LBC's because of i t s  implications fo r  domestic income d is t r ibu t ion ,  i n t e rna l  
s h i f t s  i n  scarce investment funds, and inter-country control  and d is t r ibu t ion .  
of wealth. Simply put, p r o f i t a b i l i t y  i s  important t o  explaining in te rna t iona l  
development and equity. 
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unfortunately,  " t h e r e  a ra  important empir ica l  and conceptual complica- 
t i o n s  i n  t r y i n g  t o  evaluate  how p r o f i t a b l e  foreeign operat ions are" (Moran., 
197 3: 381) . Two major d i f f i c u l t i e s  a r e  the  general  absence of r e l i a b l e  disag- 
f regated  d a t a  on p r o f i t s  on ind iv idua l  operat ions abroad and t h e  "c rea t ive  
accounting" i m p l i c i t  i n  t h e  wide d i s c r e t i o n  TNC's have i n  where they dec la re  
t h e i r  p r o f i t s .  Thus what d a t a  is ava i l ab le  is  of very l imi ted  u t i l i t y .  
The l i t t l e  d a t a  ava i l ab le  f o r  c i g a r e t t e  TNC1s i s  sub jec t  t o  a l l  these  
vagaries and thus  d i f f i c u l t  t o  i n t e r p r e t .  I n  1978, P h i l i p  Morris r epor te  
" N e t  Earnings" of 14.9% on " N e t  Assets" i n  i t s  wholly-owned fore ign subs id ia r i e s  
I (almost e n t i r e l y  tobacco opera t ions)  (Ph i l ip  Morris, Inc. , 1978: 46) . I f  this 
1 f i g u r e  i s  accurate and conceptually s i m i l a r ,  PM1s l e v e l  of p r o f i t a b i l i t y  abroad 
appears q u i t e  s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  enjoyed domestical ly by U.S. f irms during the  hey- 
day of t h e  American c i g a r e t t e  indust ry  from 1911-1950. Tennant character ized 
t h i s  l e v e l  of p r o f i t a b i l i t y  as " f a r  above competitive l e v e l s  and [ i t ]  bespeaks 
a high degree of market c o n t r o l  vigorously exercised" (Tennant, 1950: 342) . 11 
I Likewise, i n  t h e  mid-19701s, BAT repor ted  t h a t  i ts  Latin American subsid- 
i a r i e s ,  wi th  only 11-12%. of i t s  t o t a l  n e t  a s s e t s ,  accounted f o r  a f u l l  19-20% 
of i ts  t o t a l  "Turnover", and some 20-21% of i ts  t o t a l  "Operating P r o f i t s "  
(before i n t e r e s t ) .  This implies a high l e v e l  of p r o f i t a b i l i t y  on Latin Ameri- 
can operat ions.  I n  f a c t ,  i n  1974 BAT reported much higher p r o f i t  r a t e s  on i t s  
opera t ions  i n  Latin America, Asia and Africa than i n  i t s  UH, European, U.S/ 
Canada, and Aust ra l ian  regions. "Operating P r o f i t s ?  a s  a percentage of "Net 
M 
A s s e t s "  were 29.0% i n  Latin America, 35,5% i n  Asia and 29.2% i n  Africa. The 
(Operating" p r o f i t  r a t e  on "Turnover" ( inc luding taxes)  was 7.3% i n  Latin 
America and a hef ty  13.2% i n  Asia and 13-8% i n  Africa (BAT Ltd., 1874:12), 
Similarly,  Rothman's I n t e r n a t i o n a l  reported ondy 15% of i t s  t o t a l  s a l e s  i n  
Asia and 3% i n  o the r  nat ions  outs ide  t h e  UK and Europe i n  1976. But a f u l l  
30% of its "Trading P r o f i t s "  were garnered i n  Asia and 10% i n  o the r  nat ions  
I outside UK/Europe (UNCTAD, 1978: 50) . 
Technology and Employment. In  c iga re t t e  manufacture, t h i s  i s  some substi-  
t u t a b i l i t y  as between labor and cap i ta l .  The range i s  ra ther  narrow, however. 
Cigarette production, i s  highly capital-intensive with any of the several  exis t -  
i ng  "generations" of process technology. Thus while technological " f ix i ty"  i s ,  
I i n  a s t r i c t  sense, not correct ,  the labor-absorption poten t ia l  of c iga re t t e  I manufacture is ra ther  low+with any type of methods other  than the most primi- 
t i v e ,  "sweat-Shop' hand-rolling techniques. The range of subs t i t u t ab i l i t y  i s  
simply not very s ign i f ican t  for  employment creation. The industry is  thus an 
anomaly of sor ts :  a " t rad i t iona l"  industry ( l i ke  t e x t i l e s  o r  food) but a very 
capital-intensive one with very low capacity fo r  labor absorption (Fidel. e t  a l . ,  
With the progressive introduction of the  more fashionable, " l a t e s t "  product 
forms through the TNCs' product cycle, there is  a tendency fo r  TNC1s t o  employ 
more capital-intensive,  sophisticated process technology. There is  no inexor- 
able  re la t ionship between products and processes, however, and TNC's have some- 
times u t i l i zed  r e l a t i ve ly  antiquated technology when ce r t a in  loca l  conditions 
obtain, as i n  Argentina (Fidel e t  a l . ,  1977). But the replacement of older ,  
more labor-intensive methods _has been the trend i n  a var ie ty  of markets i n  
Latin America. Licensing of "international" brands by loca l  firms, f o r  exmaple,  
almost invariably involves the importation of newer, more capital-intensive 
machinery t o  produce them. Licensing has pushed loca l  firms i n  this d i rec t ion  
I i n  both Colombia and Peru, for  instance. This may be more important from a bal- 
ance of payments o r  domestic technological development perspective than an employ- 
ment-oriented one. 
Thus, TNC c iga re t t e  making technology employed i n  Latin America apparently 
var ies  only marginally from t h a t  used by many nationally-owned firms, a t  l e a s t  
i n  a labor-saving sense. TNC's have, on occasion, made imaginative use of loca l  
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engineering t a l en t  and sk i l l ed  labor t o  maintain and improve older technology, 
as  i n  Argentina, although the general i n s t i t u t i o n a l  b ias  i s  def in i te ly  towards 
the  t ransfer  of more capital-intensive,  developed-nation processes. Compared 
t o  national firms, however, TNC performance has not always been much worse. 
The r e a l  employment impact i s  t o  be found i n  agr icu l tura l  production. The 
range of a l te rna t ive  technologies f o r  leaf production i s  much broader i n  terms 
of labor absorption, and runs from very labor-intensive t o  highly capi ta l -  
intensive.  His tor ical ly ,  leaf production was extremely labor-intensive even i n  
developed nations and it remains kelat ively labor-intensive as modern agricul- 
t u r a l  technology goes. I n  recent years i n  industr ia l ized nations leaf pro- 
duction has become much more capital-intensive,  however. 
One in te res t ing  aspect of the agr icu l tura l  production i s  t h a t  there  are  no 
inherent technological reasons fo r  the production of tabaco rubio (flue-cured, 
burley and o r i en t a l  tobaccos) t o  be more labor displacing than t h a t  of tabaco 
negro. A s  a matter of f a c t ,  some facets  of l i gh t  tobacco-production (more de- 
manding cul t ivat ion,  harvesting and curing techniques, fo r  example) make it 
poten t ia l ly  more labor-intensive and employment-generating, a t  l e a s t  as com- 
pared t o  " t rad i t iona l"  technologies f o r  dark tobacco production, so the  TNC push 
fo r  l i g h t  tobacco i s  not inherently adverse fo r  employment; it a l l  depends on 
technology choice. 
T h i s  is  not t o  say t h a t  TNC-inspired s h i f t s  from tabaco negro t o  tabaco 
negro have not had an overa l l  negative impact on agr icu l tura l  employnient i n  
P
t h i s  industry, however. Four considerations a re  important here. F i r s t ,  pre- 
c i se ly  because employment has depended on technology choice, there has been 
a marked tendency f o r  labor displacement with greater  TNC dominance of the in -  
dustry. Few c igare t te  firms d i r ec t ly  produce leaf tobacco. Farm operations 
are  normally l e f t  i n  the hands of growers who are  a t  l e a s t  nomimally independent. 
Nevertheless a l l  c iga re t t e  firms are heavily involved i n  leaf production, marKet- 
employment e f fec t s .  BAT, with longer experience i n  t he  Third World, has tended 
t o  avoid t h i s ,  however. 
Secondly , the rapid hisplacement of tabaco negro by tabaco rubio has of ten 
resul ted i n  considerable regional dis locat ion within countries causing unem- 
ployment i n  the older,  tabaco negro regions while the newer "booming" tabaco 
rubio regions suf fe r  from labor sho r t ages  T h i s  is  because, generally speaking, 
the s o i l  requirements fortabaco ru io  and tabaco negro a re  qu i te  d i f f e r en t  ( the  
former requires l igh te r  texture  and lower f e r t i l i t y  while the  l a t t e r  requires 
a heavier texture  and higher f e r t i l i t y ,  especial ly  nitrogen).  Thus, a l l  over 
Latin America one encounters older ,  established dark tobacco zones i n  c r i s i s  
(Corrientes i n  Argentina; Tumbes i n  Peru; Sander i n  Colombia) while newer 
l i g h t  tobacco regions booming but lack workers (Salta,  Jujuy i n  Argentina; 
Satipo, Tingo Maria i n  Peru; Huila i n  Colombia) . 
Another dis turbing impact on employment has resu l ted  from the  r e l a t i ve ly  
rapid s h i f t  t o  tabaco rubio by TNC's. Although there  i s  no technological 
reason f o r  it ,  especial ly  given the low r u r a l  wage r a t e s  common i n  Latin Amer- 
i c a  and the general lack of economies of scale  i n  leaf production, the develop- 
ment of l i g h t  tobacco production has led t o  a general s h i f t  from smaller t o  
larger  production units.  Whereas tabaco negro was and i s  generally produced 
by small farmers, peasants and sharecroppers ( the " t r ad i t i ona l  s ec to r " ) ,  the 
farming of tabaco rubio has come t o  be concentrated among larger ,  r i cher  "corn- 
mercial" farmers (the "modern sector*') ..
There a re  various reasons fo r  t h i s ,  only b r i e f ly  explored here. F i r s t ,  
governmental loca l  content po l ic ies  and the need fo r  large quant i t i es  of l i g h t  
leaf i n  a shor t  period of time led TNC's  (and nat ional  firms t o  an extent)  t o  
focus on larger  farmers. Secondly, t o  induce farmers t o  produce a new crop l i ke  
Light tobacco, firms had t o  o f f e r  r e l a t i ve ly  high pr ices  which a t t rac ted  larger  
cormnercial farmers. Thirdly, ce r ta in  in f ras t ruc ture  investments such as  curing 
barns require a cer ta in  sca le  for  e f f i c i e n t  u t i l i z a t i o n  and larger  f inancial  I 
capacity than most smaller producers i n  Latin America prossess. Final ly ,  
most TNC' s ,  i n  t h e i r  haste t o  get  production ro l l ing ,  have reasoned t h a t  it is  
much eas ie r  administratively,  t o  supply c r ed i t ,  extension, technical  assistance,  
inputs ,  e tc .  t o  a smaller number of larger  commercial farmers than it i s  t o  work 
with large numbers of small producers. 
Lastly, it i s  undoubtedly t rue  t h a t  TNCs' vast  expansion of c iga re t t e  output 
has created greater demand f o r  leaf and thereby created considerable secondary 
employment i n  the agr icu l tura l  sector of many LDC's, Latin America included. 
On the other hand, even i f  t o t a l  employment i s  now greater  than it was before, I 
the qual i ty  of and income from t h a t  employment i s  almost cer ta in ly  worse. Xn 
other words, while the t o t a l  number of jobs i n  producing leaf may have expanded, 
those jobs are  now poorer paying unskilled labor on la rger  l i g h t  tobacco farms 
as  opposed t o  higher paying, higher sk i l led . labor  as small producers of dark 
tobacco. 
With the introduction of improved, new products and rapid growth i n  cigar- 
e t t e  manufacturing, the  TNC-dominated industr ies  of Latin America have w i t -  
nessed a subs tan t ia l  t ransfer  of technology i n  both the i ndus t r i a l  and agricul- 
t u r a l  sectors. Domestic s k i l l s  have been improved, production, qual i ty  has been 
ra ised,  and secondary employment created, Nevertheless, technological depend- 
ence continues and is l ike ly  t o  get  worse as demand i s  increasingly t i e d  t o  the 
internat ional  product cycle. Vir tual ly  no TNC R&D i s  carr ied out locally,  loca l  
loca l  products such as dark tobacco c igare t tes  a re  being phased out ,  and both 
indus t r i a l  and agr icu l tura l  production i s  becoming inextr icably bound up with 
the " internat ional  trends" of the  industry through imported process and product 
technology. In  these conditions, what loca l  i ndus t r i a l  and agr icu l tura l  know- 
how as ex i s t s  i s  l i ke ly  t o  atrophy or  a t  l e a s t  be confined t o  loca l  "adaptation" 
chores. 12 
Trade and Balance of Payments. World t rade i n  c igare t tes  i s  not large com- 
pared t o  t o t a l  world production -- about 6% i n  1975 (USDA, 1976). The most 
important reason i s  the presence of subs tan t ia l  t a r i f f s  and other t rade ba r r i e r s  
i n  most markets, Nations have t r ad i t i ona l ly  tended towards protectionism with 
regards t o  loca l  tobacco industr ies  f o r  balance of payments.and f i s c a l  reasons, 
Import subs t i tu t ion  indus t r ia l iza t ion  i n  the  L13C1s has simply imitated the a t t i -  
tude of D C 1 s  vis-a-vis t h i s  "non-essential" commodity. A l l  governments have 
thought t h a t  there are  f a r  be t t e r  ways of spending scarce foreign exchange. 
Another fac tor  l imit ing t rade has been the almost exclusive dominance of 
a handful of TNC's  i n  the  trade t h a t  does take place. Protectionism came f i r s t ,  
but TNC' s  have tended t o  reinforce the pa t te rn  i n  various ways. Without con- 
centrat ion of the industry i n  the hands of TNC1s it seems l i ke ly  t h a t  there 
would be a somewhat larger  world t rade i n  c igaret tes .  For example, i f  TNC' s  I 
I 
were not so dominant there  would probably be more loca l  and regional t rade be- 
cause TNC's  routinely impose t e r r i t o r i a l  r e s t r i c t i ons  on subsidiar ies  not t o  
export t h e i r  production of "international" brands. These export r e s t r i c t i ons  
a r e  of ten imposed on l icenses ,  too. TNC's  are not about t o  t r y  t o  export Marl- 
boros from Brazi l  t o  Argentina when they a l so  have a subsidiary producing them 
i n  Argentina. Subsidiaries and l icensees a re  prohibited from taking p a r t  i n  
in te rna t iona l  t rade which i s  reserved t o  the "home" p lan ts  back i n  the indus t r ia l -  
ized nations. Thus, export performance i n  c igare t tes  i s  affected by TNC po l ic ies  
as wel l  as  by governmental protectionism. 
On the other hand, the development of leaf tobacco has been supported by 
TNC's who "have persuaded loca l  government, desperate fo r  foreign exchange and 
I 
operating on s tarvat ion budgets, t h a t  growing tobacco themselves w i l l  give I 
t h e i r  farmers a new cash crop, beef up government revenues through tobacco I 
taxes and bring i n  hard currencies v i a  tobacco exportsgs (Ross, 1980:146). 
The development of loca l  sources of leaf has been consistent with TNC i n t e r e s t s  
i n  lower leaf pr ices  worldwide and TNC's  have of ten been forced by loca l  con- 
t e n t  regulations t o  develop. loca l  tobacco suplies.  So TNC's have tended t o  en- 
courage a product-cycle-type s h i f t  of leaf production t o  LDC's ,  which now ac- 
count for  some 55% of world leaf tobacco exports (UNCTAD, 1978: 96). 
About one-quarter of a l l  leaf produced enters  in te rna t iona l  t rade (UNCTAD, 
1978:96). In Latin America, Argentina, Mexico, Brazil  and Colombia are  s ign i f i -  
cant exporters and several  smaller nations (Nicaragua, Honduras, Paraguay) a lso I 
export. None are very dependent on tobacco exports, however. Brazi l ,  f o r  ex- 
cample, exported $60-70 mill ion annually 1971-74 but this accounted fo r  l ess  
than 1.2% of its exports (UNCTAD, 1978: 96). 
Several factors  have influenced the decisive s h i f t  of leaf production t o  
LDC ' s , breaking up long-establis hed Leaf t rade patterns.  F i r s t ,  UN-imposed 
t rade sanctions against  Rhodesia i n  1965 p a r t i a l l y  removed the U,S. growers' 
p r inc ipa l  qual i ty  export r i v a l  i n  flue-cured leaf ,  leading t o  a scarc i ty  of high 
qua l i ty  leaf and wider pr ice  d i f f e r en t i a l s .  In  many ways t h i s  r e sp i t e  simply 
postponed the day of reckoning fo r  U. S. farmers. T h i s ,  i n  tu rn ,  opened up some 
space i n  the world flue-cured markets fo r  cheaper LDC " f i l l e r "  leaf and gave 
r i s e  t o  greater p r i ce  competition (USDA, 1976a). Moreover, technological 
changes i n  manufacturing have made it possible t o  subs t i t u t e  more f i l l e r  leaf 
while the qual i ty  of LDC leaf has improved. Finally, TNC expansion abroad, the 
s h i f t  t o  "American -Blend1' l i g h t  tobacco c igare t tes ,  and TNC development of l oca l  
sources of supply have opened up a l te rna t ive  markets outside D C q s  as well  as 
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greater possf b i l i t k e s  fort exprts to DC'5. on major cigarette.  leaf categories 
l ike  flue-cured and burley ,(USDA, 1976b:L). 
These changes have had considerable negative impact on U. S. leaf tobacco 
exports, once overwhelmingly dominant in i n t e rna t iona l  trade. The U.S.  share of 
world tobacco exports has dropped f m .  61% in 1960 to. 29%. in 1979 and U . S .  
cigarette firms have increasd.the-propo&ion of foreign tobacco in U . S .  cig- 
are t tes  from some 11% in 1965 to< 30% in 1980 .{Kinney, 1981: 119) . 
FTgures 3-8 teXl most of the story of the decline in U.S. tobacco's place 
in world trade and the rise of 2DC producers. Wor3d production of umanufactmed 
leaf has outpaced CF. S, prduction consistently since 1966 j w h i l e  U. S. production 
has not r e a l l y  declined in absolute. terms, foreign producers (mostly LDCt sl 'have 
accounted for almost a l l  the new growth (Figure  3 ) .  More remarkable is the  fact 
that non-U.S. producers' growth has been especially rapid' in precisely the types 
of tobacco (f lue-cured and burley). mat were of U, S. origin and are the major 
components of the "American Blend" Light Cobacco cigarette (Figures 4-51, 
Burley leaf production, once almost a monopoly of U. S. growers, and only a quar- 
ter of w h i c h  .was produced outside the. U, S. in 1965, is increasing especially 
rapidly in foreign nations and non-U, S. productian, i s  now larger than U. S. 
production (Figure 5) . 
U . S .  growers, with-much more i n s t i t u t i o n a l  market pmer in the foxm of price 
supports, an auction. system, the USDA grading system, etc., have not kept pace 
w i t h  i n f l a t i o n  but have lost much less ground than LDC producers on a price/&. 
* 
basis, They have accomplished this, however, only at the cost of increasingly, 
- 
pr ic ing  themselves out. of the world m a r k e t . .  For example, in 1983 the price. of 
roughly ,comparable grades of flue-cured leaf was $L.&O/Ib .  i n  t he  U-S., $0.68 
in Zimbabwe and $0.69 in Malawi. (USDA, 1983,:10).. Thus, price d i f f e ren t i a l s  
between-W.5. and foreign leaf have tended to widen w e *  the years w i t h  LDC' 
producers trying to make up the difference in f a l l i n g  real prices for their 
by expanding t o t a l  production. Simply put,- LDC growers have been more exp lo i t ed  
I by the  market and hence t h e i r  p r i c e s  have been lower and r i s i n g  less rap id ly ,  
enabling them t o  gain  more of t h e  market (Figures 6-8). 
I .  This inc reas ing  Third World pressure  on p r i c e s  and U.S, growers has begun t o  
cause d i s l o c a t i o n s  i n  t h e  U.S. tobacco economy. Since 1975, l ea f  p r i c e s  have 
f a l l e n  se r ious ly  below t h e  USDA p a r i t y  index and Pres ident  Reagan signed a 
I b i l l  i n  e a r l y  1983 t o  f r eeze  tobacco p r i c e  support  l e v e l s  f o r  1983-84 (USDA, 
1983:lO). There have been suggest ions made by l a rge  l ea f  t r a d e r s  and TNC's 
t h a t  t h e  U.S. abo l i sh  t h e  auct ion  system p r i c e  suppor ts ,  e t c ,  and move t o  a sys- 
tem of d i r e c t  "con t rac t  buying" (whereby l a r g e  buyers'  oligopsony market power 
can be more e a s i l y  exerc ised)  l i k e  t h a t  commonly employed i n  LDC's. This would 
supposedly "save" the  U.S. tobacco expor t  market by keeping p r i c e s  down and 
e l imina t ing  "government in tervent ion"  and d i s t o r t i o n s .  
T N C t s  and t h e  l a r g e  l ea f  tobacco t r a d i n g  f irms based i n  D C ' s  have thus  aided 
i n  t h e  emergence of expor ts  from LDC' s such a s  Ind ia ,  B r a z i l ,  Argentina, P h i l -  
i pp ines ,  Malawi, e t c .  This l ea f  t r a d e  i s  highly concentrated and some of t h e  
major TNC' s a r e  important leaf  d e a l e r s  (BAT and Imperial  ) (UNCTAD, 1978: 88-115) . 
On occasion, expor ts  have helped l o c a l  growers p a r t i a l l y  escape t h e  e f f e c t s  of 
TNC monopsony power i n  the  l o c a l  market, thus  p a r t l y  "backfir ing" a g a i n s t  TNC's 
i n  the  long run, a s  i n  Argentina. I n  o the r  markets l i k e  Brazi l ,  however, BAT 
markets some 80% of l ea f  expor ts  and buys t h e  g r e a t  major i ty  of l ea f  used loca l -  
l y  a s  w e l l  (UNCTAD, 1978:88). 
TNC involvement i n  smuggling i s  a l s o  problematic f o r  t h e  t r a d e  s i t u a t i o n  
of LDC's. This obviously d r a i n s  away sca rce  fore ign exchange, although t h e  
acute contraband phase does no t  usual ly  l a s t  more than s e v e r a l  years .  More 
important  -- though d i f f i c u l t  t o  document here  i n  t h e  absence of more s p e c i f i c  
d a t a  -- t he  TNCs' higher propensi ty  t o  import. Fancy, " i n t e r n a t i o n a l  brand" 
products  and more cap i t a l - in tens ive  processes tend t o  r equ i re  a v a r i e t y  of 
J 
imported components. For exampld, it i s  qui te  common fo r  governments t o  grant a 
5-10 year "grace" period during which TNC's a re  allowed t o  import a progressive- 
I ly  declining percentage of foreign tobacco fo r  t h e i r  high-quality brands while I TNC's develop loca l  sources of supply. T h i s  imported, pre-mixed and highly- - 
processed tobacco blend can be very expensive. This grade period i s  often 
I granted when TNC' s l icense loca l  firms. I Higher import coeff ic ients  of TNC's  are  linked t o  other materials as  well. I Sophisticated, high-speed cigarette-making machinery used by TNC's w i l l  usual- 
l y  not run with locally-made c igare t te  paper, f i l t e r  rod material ,  glues, e tc .  
And the "qual i ty  standards" imposed by TNC's f o r  t h e i r  "international" brands 
of ten require imported packaging materials,  f i l t e r s ,  e t c ,  Technology fees  on 
these brands and other "technical  assistance" charges fur ther  aggravate balance 
of payments problems. 
TNC's may also have a d i r e c t  pecuniary i n t e r e s t  i n  expanding intra-firm 
e 
t rade  -- which i n  t u rn  permits lucrat ive t ransfer  p r ic ing  s t ra teg ies .  BAT may, 
. f o r  example, suggest the  v i t a l  necessity of buying new cigarette-making machin- 
ery from Molins and imported packaging materials from Mardin ( in  both of which 
it holds a subs tan t ia l  i n t e r e s t . )  Ph i l ip  Morris noted tha t  it had made a ne t  
pos i t ive  contribution of over $200 mill ion t o  the  U.S. balance of payments through 
the export of c iga re t t e s ,  leaf tobacco and other manufacturing components i n  
1978 (Pki l ip  Morris, Inc., 1978: 11). TCN-inspired imports can thus wipe out 
any foreign exchange gains from increased tobacco exports. T h i s  has reportedly 
taken place i n  Zambia (Ross, 1980: 146) . 
I On t he  other hand, TNC' s  have not always performed much worse than loca l  
firms. i n  some of these areas. TNC1s  have sometimes complied b e t t e r  with loca l  
content d i rec t ives  than loca l  firms which tend t o  r e s i s  the  investment t h i s  
implies. Local firms making l i g h t  tobacco c igare t tes  on t h e i r  own o r  under 
l icense of ten import more foreign tobacco. And loca l  content regulations Oil  
c iga re t t e  paper, f i l t e r s ,  etc. may make it d i f f i c u l t  t o  produce lower t a r  
c igare t tes  local ly  without importing these components from' industr ia l ized nations. 
Linkage Effects and Income Distribution. The most important linkage on, t h i s  
industry is with. leaf productiono In  terms of sheer numbers of peopde this is 
a very important question, and especial ly  so since leaf growers tend t o  be 
small farmers, peasants and sharecroppers i n  LBC's. Overall, TNC performance 
with  respect t o  leaf growers has not been c lear ly  worse than t h a t  of locally- 
owned firms. On the whole, TNCs' re la t ionships  with. farmers have probably been 
be t t e r  than those of nat ional  firms.. LocaL firms have tended t o  a c t  l i k e  robber 
barons vis-a-vis loca l  tobacco growers, exploi t ing them t o  the h i l t ,  In Peru, 
f o r  example, patron-client re la t ions  and monopsonistic exploi ta t ion by loca l  
f i m s  have been the rule. TNC re la t ionships  with growers have more of ten follow- 
ed the model of t h e i r  re la t ionships  with loca l  labor unions, creat ing "labor 
a r i s tocrac ies , "  and i f  TNC's can be faul ted it i s  f o r  a tendency t o  work with 
la rger ,  r i cher  "commercial" farmers. 
There i s  a l so  a ce r t a in  cycle involved i n  TNC-farmer re la t ions .  To foment 
l i gh t  tobacco production, fo r  example, TNC's  have of ten s t a r t ed  out offer ing 
subs tan t ia l  incentives t o  loca l  farmers: high leaf p r i ce s ,  low-cost inputs ,  
f ree  technical  ass is tance,  low-interest loans, 10s-cost in f ras t ruc ture  con- 
s t ruc t ion ,  a tc .  Once production is  well  established f ive  t o  ten years l a t e r ,  
however, monopsonistic power takes over and the terms harden considerably. 
Since marketing, technical  assistance,  and input channels are  a l l  monopolized 
through exclusive contracts,  this means farmers' costs  and income are  largely 
Y 
company-dicated. These kinds of problems with fanners led Mexico t o  force 
TNC's  i n t o  minority equity posi t ions  i n  the  ear ly  19701s, I n  other nations,  
such as Argentina, only as tu te  p o l i t i c a l  organization, the  slow development 
of countervailing power, and export markets have enabled growers t o  p a r t i a l l y  
escape these e f f ec t s  of TNC monopsony. 
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National firms have probably done be t t e r  i n  developing other linkages with 
loca l  suppliers than TNC's .  The l a t t e r  have tended t o  import non-leaf components 
when possible. Pr ior  t o  denationalization.  loca l  Argentine firms had developed 
a wide var ie ty  of backward linkages with loca l  suppl iers ,  produced p a r t s  them- 
selves ,  adapted production processes and even b u i l t  e n t i r e  machines from scratch 
(sometimes copying established engineering designs a l a  Japan). 
The s i t ua t ion  with respect t o  loca l  d i s t r i bu to r s ,  jobbers and r e t a i l e r s  is 
l e s s  c lear .  BAT does not have a very good h i s t o r i c a l  record i n  this regard i n  
Latin America, having preferred t o  control  d i s t r i bu t ion  i t s e l f  o r  squeeze 
loca l  d i s t r i bu to r s '  margins. But U. S. TNC' s do not seem t o  have acted so 
rapaciously, nor has BAT more recently.  Pnd national firms have had t h e i r  own 
s t ruggles  with these sectors ,  sometimes in tegra t ing  ve r t i ca l ly  i n t o  wholesaling. 
With respect t o  Income d is t r ibu t ion .  the worst offenders i n  t h i s  industry 
are  governments. Latin American governments have frequently had r e l a t i ve ly  
antiquated f i s c a l  s t ruc tures  i n  which highly-regressive c iga re t t e  taxes have 
figured importantly. I n  the  ear ly  1970's. 10-15% of many Latin American 
nations '  revenues came from c iga re t t e  taxes. These taxes were often the  s ingle  
la rges t  source of i n t e rna l  revenue. These taxes a re  highly regressive i n  
t h e i r  incidence, t ransfer r ing  money out of the pockets of consumers (many of them 
poor) and in to  government coffers.  Like high t a r i f f s  i n  the  U.S. during the 
19th century. they a l so  have the  unfortunate e f f e c t  of re l iev ing  pressure on the 
government t o  levy e f fec t ive  and progressive income taxes. L i t t l e  c iga re t t e  
t a x  revenue i s  usually returned t o  the poor i n  the form of public services useful  
t o  them. While c iga re t t e  taxation is highly regressive i n  most nations,  it i s  
probably more inequitable i n  LDC's  with t h e i r  greater  inequa l i t i es  of income 
d is t r ibu t ion ,  
I n  round figures,  governments have normally received some 50-60% of the  
r e t a i l  p r ice  of c igare t tes  i n  Latin America i n  the  form of taxes, manufacturers 
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and d is t r ibu tors  have received 30-35%) and leaf growers have received about 
5-10%.13 Apart from the portions going t o  growers and some p a r t  of the  d i s t r i -  
bution force,  not much of the proceeds have gone t o  unskil led labor. The major- 
i t y  of income generated has probably gone t o  the  top 25-30% of the  work force,  
although i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  specify without more precise  data. Despite a l l  t h i s ,  
the industry s t i l l  probably performs be t t e r  i n  an income-distribution-sense 
than many other "modern" and/or TNC-dominated sectors  such as  autos and chemi- 
cals .  This i s  because there a re  a t  l e a s t  some payments t o  low-income groups 
l i ke  farmers and portions of the  wholesale and r e t a i l  sa les  force. With expand- 
ing  sa les  under TNC's ,  this e f f e c t  has been reinforced. 
Although loca l  c igare t te  firms have also operated i n  t i g h t  oligopoly o r  
even quasi-monopoly conditions, TNC market power has had an independent ad- 
verse e f f ec t  on income d is t r ibu t ion  i n  the  industry. National firms are  usual- 
ly  owned by resident nationals. T h i s  tends t o  reduce the in te rna t iona l  trans- 
f e r  of income. And national firms have usually been l e s s  e f f i c i e n t  a t  get t ing 
consumers t o  spend t h e i r  money on c igare t tes .  Thus, there  has been less  re- 
gressive impact, especial ly  through taxation,  but a l so  t o  the ol igopol is ts  
themselves. TNC's ,  however, have sh i f ted  pr ices  even higher when possible,  con- 
vinced more consumers t o  spend more of t h e i r  scarce income on c igare t tes ,  and 
I 
t ransferred a t  l ea s t  some of t h i s  income abroad- To the extent t o  which TNC's 
have caused a lower labor/capi ta l  r a t i o  (especially i n  agr icu l ture) ,  this may 
a l so  have had an adverse impact on income dis t r ibut ion.  
Basic Human Needs and Product Appropriateness. For reasons of public health, 
c igare t tes  a re  qu i te  obviously not a very "appropriate" product, The case 
against  c igare t tes  may be much stronger i n  LDC% where vast  sectors  of the popu- 
lace frequently lack the most rudimentary forms of food, clothing and she l te r ,  
and i n i t i a l  heal th  standards a r e  already low, Furthermore, there is  abundant 
evidence, some of it c i t ed  above, t h a t  TNC' s  are  more adept a t  the  promotioil of 
c iga re t t e  smoking and a t  increasing the  per  cap i ta ,  consumption of c igare t tes .  
Our analysis  above of the  demand creat ion and production aspects of the  industry 
suggests t h a t  t he  case fo r  even nationally-owned p r iva t e  c iga re t t e  firms might 
be doubly-strong: (a)  they are  almost ce r ta in ly  l e s s  e f f i c i e n t  a t  p rom~t ing  
L 
c iga re t t e  consumption than a re  TNC's, which i s  "good".because of the  adverse 
heal th  e f f e c t s  of smoking and basic needs resource a l loca t ion  considerations; 
I and, (b) they a re  not l i ke ly  t o  be too i n e f f i c i e n t  i n  c iga re t t e  production a t  I even very low leve ls  of volume because of the  lack of production economies of I scale.  I f  the  production scale  economies are  c lose  t o  non-existent i n  the  
industry,  and the  economies of sca le  t h a t  do e x i s t  a re  p r iva te  ones involved 
i n  the  adver t is ing,  d i s t r i bu t ion  and promotion of c iga re t t e s ,  then the  t rad i t ion-  
a l  argument fo r  TNC' s  as  "more e f f i c i en t "  than na t iona l  companies does s hold 
i n  t h i s  industry. On the  contrary,  both basic  needs and public heal th  c r i t e r i a  
would c lear ly  ind ica te  v i r t u a l l y  any other a l t e rna t ive  than the  very "e f f ic ien t"  
TNC. In  f a c t ,  the  somnolent decay of a f u l l  nat ional  monopoly -- e i t h e r  p r iva te  
o r  public -- might be jus t  what the  doctor ordered, 
Although t h i s  i s  not as  unabiguously c l ea r  a s  the  TNC a b i l i t y  t o  increase 
c iga re t t e  consumption, it appears t h a t  the  d i f fus ion  of "safer" ( i f  there  i s  
such a thing) low tar/low nicot ine  product forms t o  LDC's has been co l lec t ive ly  
slowed or  "withheld" by the  in te rna t iona l  c iga re t t e  oligopoly u n t i l  such time 
a s  the  product-cycle f o r  older  and l e s s  "safe" product forms has run i ts course 
i n  LDC's and heal th  issues  surrounding c iga re t t e s  become much more publ ic ly  
c o n t r b v e r s i a ~  than they a re  a t  present. No TNC c iga re t t e  firm has been eager I 
t o  impl ic i t ly  r a i s e  this i ssue  i t s e l f  by t he  introduction of these product forms i 
i n  LDC's.  To do so would be t o  make obsolete a f a i r  proportion of the TPJC's 
ex i s t ing  products f o r  which r en t s  may s t i l l  be had. Many LDC's  have only re- 
cent ly  begun t o  consumer subs tan t ia l  quan t i t i t e s  of " f i r s t  generation," 1950's- 
s t y l e  f i l t e r e d  c iga re t t e s  i n  place of non-fi l ters.  I n  many other markets, 
s t i l l  a novelty (e.g. l O O m m  and 120mm f i l t e r s ,  menthol f i l t e r s ,  charcoal  f i l -  
ters, e t c . ) ,  Thus, TNC's have usual ly  been c a r e f u l  i n  t h e i r  operat ions i n  LDC's  
not t o  jump t h e  gun" and r e l e a s e  more "advanced" product forms than t h e  given 
na t iona l  market i s  "ready for"  i n  t h e  product-cycle. 14 
The indust ry  r e t o r t  t o  this i s  t h a t  "revealed consumer preference" i n  LDC's 
I is  f o r  t h e i r  r e l a t i v e l y  high t a r / h i g h  n ico t ine  product forms, e spec ia l l$  s ince  
p e r  c a p i t a  consumption i s  r e l a t i v e l y  low. A s  a BAT spokesman pu t  it, " I f  you 
a r e  smoking only one o r  two c i g a r e t t e s  a day you want t o  f e e l  you have had some- 
t h i n g  f o r  your money" ("Third World Tobacco Push Hit," 1978:Z). While may be 
p a r t i a l l y  t r u e  i n  a few LDC markets where p e r  c a p i t a  consumption is extremely 
low and c i g a r e t t e  smoking i s  not  well-established,  it probably does not  apply 
i n  t h e  g r e a t  majori ty of LDC markets where p e r  c a p i t a  c i g a r e t t e  consumption 
among the  smoking age populat ion i s  already much g rea te r  than "one o r  two cigar-  
e t t e s  a day." More importantly, i f  consumers do not have t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  of 
choosing between c i g a r e t t e  brands with high t a r / n i c o t i n e  and those wi th  low 
t a r  and n ico t ine  because the  l a t t e r  a re  simply not  made ava i l ab le  (or not  pro- 
moted heavily where they a r e ) ,  then how can "consumer preference" manage t o  
"reveal" i t s e l f  i n  favor of high t a r / n i c o t i n e  c i g a r e t t e s ?  Consumers do not  have 
a meaningful choice. 
I n  most LDC's ,  t h e  smoking/health i s s u e  has been almost t o t a l l y  absent from 
pub l ic  debate. The adverse hea l th  e f f e c t s  of c i g a r e t t e  smoking have not become 
I 
publ ic  knowledge. Nor has the  se r ious  publ ic  h e a l t h  hazard t h a t  smoking poses 
9 become an ob jec t  of governmental ac t ion  i n  most LDC's. This i n  i t s e l f  has 
g r e a t l y  f a c i l i t a t e d  TNC expansion: TNC's o f t en  f ind  it e a s i e r  tcrmarket t h e i r  
products i n  LDC's than i n  t h e i r  home nat ions  because the re  a r e  few r e s t r i c t i o n s  
on adver t i s ing  and the  notion of warnings on ind iv idua l  packs i s  v i r t u a l l y  un- 
heard of ("Third World f o r  Cigare t tes  Expands," 1978:13). For example a recent  
World Health Organization survey showed t h a t  of 100 governments providing in- 
formation, 70 had no l e g i s l a t i o n  whatsoever aimed a t  c o n t r o l l i n g  t h e  promotion 
o r  use of c i g a r e t t e s  ("Next Step Toward WHO Tobacco Control," 1976:14). Despite 
WHO e f f o r t s  i n  r ecen t  yea rs ,  and heightened government a c t i v i t y  i n  i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  
nat ions  t o  reduce smoking hazards t o  heal th ,  most governments i n  LDC's  have 
taken no ac t ion  i n  t h i s  area.  Another survey by t h e  U.S. National Clearinghouse 
f o r  Smoking and Health revealed t h a t  over two dozen LDC's  ( including a l l  14 
Latin American nat ions  surveyed) had taken no ac t ion  i n  the  regula t ion of c igar-  
e t te  adver t i s ing  and t h e  g r e a t  major i ty  had no warnings on c i g a r e t t e  packs 
(Pakkala, 1 9 7 6 ~ 5 5 ) .  Thus, smoking and h e a l t h  a c t i v i t i e s  remain i n  a very low 
key i n  most LDC's.  A s  Tanzania's hea l th  d i r e c t o r  p u t  it succ inc t ly ,  "Smoking- 
r e l a t e d  d i seases  a r e  not  regarded a s  a matter  of concern a t  t h e  present  t i m e "  
("Third World Tobacco Push Hit," 1978: 2 )  . 
It seems l i k e l y  t h a t  t h e  smoking/health aspects  of t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c igar-  
e t t e  o l igopo ly ' s  opera t ions  i n  LDC's w i l l  become increas ingly  sub jec t  t o  
sc ru t iny  and c r i t i c i s m .  Despite LDC's  publ ic  inac t ion  on t h i s  score ,  t h e  i s s u e  
i s  already becoming t h e  sub jec t  of considerable debate i n  t h e  WHO and o the r  in-  
t e r n a t i o n a l  fora.  The WHO reported l a s t  year: " In  some developing countr ies  
t h e  epidemic of smoking-related d i sease  i s  already of such magnitude a s  t o  r i v a l  
even in fec t ious  d i sease  o r  malnutr i t ion  a s  a publ ic  h e a l t h  problem" I n  B r a z i l ,  
lung cancer became t h e  leading cause of male death  i n  1974 and Brazi l ians  dying 
of cardiovascular  d i sease  l inked t o  smoking has gone up 5% s ince  1970 (Ross, 
1980: 145) . 
Cul tu ra l  Imperialism and Dependence. Is dependence and c u l t u r a l  imperialism 
involved i n  t h e  TNC's evident  a b i l i t y  t o  change consumption p a t t e r n s  i n  LDC's? 
Is c u l t u r a l  i d e n t i t y  l inked t o  a brand name o r  product form i n  t h e  l o c a l  language 
and t r a d i t i o n ?  I n  o the r  words, i s  p a r t  of the  Latin American na t iona l  and region- 
a l  i d e n t i t y  l inked t o  t h e  consumption of t - k  r a t h e r  than tabaco rubio 
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c i g a r e t t e s ?  There c l e a r l y  - a r e  psychological  l i n k s  between products  and c u l t u r a l  
i d e n t i t i e s .  Anyone who has l ived  i n  Lat in  America f o r  any per iod  of t i m e  knows 
t h e  snobbish preference  f o r  foreign-made o r  foreign-brand goods i s  o f t e n  very 
I s t rong ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  among the  e l i t e .  And t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  this tends  t o  den- 
1 -  i g r a t e  o r  des t rog  t h e  v a l i d i t y  of t h e  pe r son ' s  c u l t u r a l  i d e n t i t y  and he r i t age ,  
I some kind of d e s t r u c t i o n  of t h e  l o c a l  c u l t u r e  does take  place.  
I n  many p a r t s  of Latin America, this kind of preference f o r  fore ign goods 
and brand names is  very s t rong  (Schmidt, 1971). It is  undoubtedly p a r t  of the  
contraband problem It o f t e n  e n t a i l s  a c e r t a i n  degree of deprecia t ion  of Lat in  
Americans' perspect ive  on t h e i r  own s t y l e  of l i f e  and p a t t e r n s  of consumption. 
It re in fo rces  a sense of backwardness and dependent. I n  Peru, f o r  example, the  
idea  t h a t  ppor-wuality, nationally-made products  a r e  a r e f l e c t i o n  of  Peruvian 
underdevelopment and dependence is  q u i t e  evident .  This i s  c l e a r l y  r e l a t e d  t o  
the  kind of "facaso-mania" ( f a i l u r e  complex) and down-grading of one ' s  own cul-  
t u e  t h a t  Hirschman noted i n  Latin American (Hirschman, 1970b:340). 
I n  some of t h e  l a r g e r  na t ions  of t h e  region (Argentina, Braz i l ,  Mexico), 
the  sense of "consumer nationalism" i s  never the less  somewhat more developed. 
In  c i g a r e t t e s ,  a t  l e a s t ,  these  na t ions  have shown some enduring preference  f o r  
n a t i o n a l  brands and product forms wi th  indigenous fea tu res .  These have some 
n a t i o n a l  c u l t u r a l  i d e n t i t y  t h a t  somehow " f i t s "  wi th  t h e i r  h i s t o r y  and t r a d i -  I 
t i o n s .  Thus, TNC's i n  t h e s e  markets have sometimes had t o  go t o  considerable 
length  t o  develop o r  " reposi t ion"  n a t i o n a l  brands embodying these  f ea tu res .  
II They have f requent ly  been r a t h e r  unsuccessful  a t  popular iz ing  t h e  more osten- 
t a t i o u s l y  "foreign" brands. Despite years  of heavy promotion, f o r  example, 
Marlboro i s  s t i l l  not  a very l a rge - se l l ing  c i g a r e t t e  i n  Argentina. However, I 
European TNC's l i k e  BAT and Reemstma have been r a t h e r  less e thnocentr ic  i n  this 
sense,  perhaps because of t h e i r  longer h i s t o r y  of opera t ions  overseas o r  t h e i r  
experiences wi th in  t h e  m u l t i c u l t u r a l  European context .  They have not  pushed I 
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t h e i r  whome-grown" successes i n  Latin America t o  the  degree U.S. firms have. 
Par t icu la r ly  i n  the  e a r l i e r  years of U.S. TNC expansion, U.S. firms did not 
always appreciate the degree t o  which American c iga re t t e s  and t h e i r  demand 
creat ion s t r a t eg i e s  were i l l-adapted t o  loca l  conditions. For excample, des- 
p i t e  i ts  s t a tu s  as  the  world's largest-sel l ing c igare t te ,  Marlboro's "Cowboy" 
advert is ing has met considerable cu l tu ra l  res is tance and loca l  c r i t i c i sm i n  a 
var ie ty  of markets from Brazil  t o  Australia ("Marlboro' s Brazil ian Move ," 1976) . 
"Consumer nationalism" and c r i t i c a l  reactions t o  TNCs' cu l tu ra l  impact has been 
manifested i n  a number of ways, from pro tes t s  against  the  use of foreign models 
i n  c igare t te  advertising t o  "Nationala Cigarette Weeks" ("Local Talent i n  Phil- 
l ip ines  , " 1977 ; "Indonesian Cigarette Week Observed," 1979) . 
The i n i t i a l  TNC foothold i n  many markets was of ten gained by the promotion 
of foreign "international" brands. But even nat ional  brands developed or  "re- 
I positioned" by T N C t s  l i g h t  tobacco " internat ional"  brands. Hence, once the 
snobbish preference fo r  foreign products becomes apparent, and TNC product forms 
I are viewed are  "superior" -- aided and abetted by TNC demand creat ion e f f o r t s  -- 
then dependence i s  almost a foregone conclusion fo r  nat ional  c iga re t t e  industr ies .  
With consumption directed down through product forms and channels i n  which TNC's  
possess the overwhelming competitive advantage, dependence i s  indeed d i f f i c u l t  
t o  escape. National firms a re  a t  a continual and systematic disadvantage i n  
I this kind of competitive s i tua t ion .  I But even i f  T N C t s  are  responsible fo r  s h i f t i n g  consumption pat terns  towards I t h e i r  products, might this not be the d i rec t ion  of "bet ter"  i n  some objective I sense than nationally-owned firms' products? It is  not c lear ,  f o r  example, 
whether the trend t o  l i g h t  tobacco and "American Blend" c igare t tes  r e f l e c t s  
some "autonomously-determined," world-wide trend towards a "superiortt product 
(as perhaps i n  the world-wide diffusion of t he  radio,  ra i l roads ,  o r  maybe even 
the automobile) or whether t h i s  trend i s  a specif ic ,  wholly demand creation- 
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induced e f f e c t  of TNC's.  What becomes very d i f f i c u l t  t o  f e r r e t  o u t  here i s  t h e  
degree t o  which t h e  "revealed preference" o r  apparent demand f o r  U. S. -s ty  l e  
l i g h t  tobacco c i g a r e t t e s  i s  due t o  t h e i r  inheren t ,  " rea l "  q u a l i t y  (which commands 
an economic r e n t  viewed a s  l eg i t ima te ) ,  on t h e  one hand, o r  whether it i s  due 
t o  the  e f f e c t i v e  demand c r e a t i o n  e f f o r t s  of TNC's and a snobbish preference f o r  
fore ign goods of the  e l i t e ,  on t h e  other.  A t  l e a s t  by the  standard of "revealed 
preference" a r e  w e  t o  assume t h a t  t h e  consumer welfare i s  g r e a t e r  from TNC I 
brands? A judicious assessment of t h i s  thorny quest ion would probably e n t a i l  I I t h e  recognit ion t h a t  i n  some s p e c i f i c  aspects  TNC product q u a l i t y  is  probably I I higher than many nationally-owned f irms'  products. But " reveal ted  preferences" I 
have been powerfully shaped by TNC's themselves through e f f e c t i v e  techniques of I 
demand c rea t ion  (and, a s  w e  have seen, even t ak ing  advantage of contraband). 
A t  t h i s  juncture,  some kind of normative o r  " p o l i t i c a l "  judgement i s  in-  
dispensable, p rec i se ly  t h e  kind of c r i t e r i a  usual ly  eschewed by neo-classical  
b 
and mainstream economists a s  un jus t i f i ed .  I n  LDC's, even i f  product q u a l i t y  
i s  "be t t e r "  i n  some sense,  import s u b s t i t u t i o n  i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n  s t r a t e g i e s  
and broader concerns of political-economic, and perhaps c u l t u r a l ,  autonomy may 
d i c t a t e  the  s a c r i f i c e  of some short-run consumer welfare i n  high-quality goods 
f o r  the  longer-run i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n ,  political-economic and c u l t u r a l  indepen- I 
dence, and bas ic  needs of a poor country, There r e a l l y  is  nothing very new o r  
s t a r t l i n g  about this notion. I t  was p rac t i ced  i n  an e f f e c t i v e  manner by most 
of t h e  now-industrialized nat ions  of t h e  world vis-a-vis B r i t i s h  goods t o  
p r o t e c t  t h e i r  " i n f a n t  indus t r i e s . "  F ina l ly ,  the re  i s  no escape from t h e  almost- 
t r i t e ,  b u t  requent ly-res is ted ,  observation t h a t  a l l  goods and se rv ices  a re  = 
equal  i n  importance. Some measure of increased consumer welfare  from higher- 
q u a l i t y  TNC c i g a r e t t e s  q u i t e  simply & t o  be balanced aga ins t  t h e  obviously 
more important and p ress ing  bas ic  needs of t h e  broad mass of t h e  populat ion i n  I 
LDC's. Appropriately reduced i n  s ign i f i cance  i n  this manner, t h e  consumer 
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welfare gained from higher-quality TNC c iga re t t e s  i n  LDC's is  v i r t ua l l y  mean- 
ingless ,  i f  not absurd. 
On basic needs grounds, there  may a l so  be a prima f ac i e  case f o r  socia l ly-  
unnecessary or  socially-harmful goods l i k e  c iga re t t e s  t o  be supplied loca l ly ,  r 
not only i n  s t r i c t  accordance with l oca l  t a s t e s ,  c u l t u r a l  pa t t e rns ,  e tc .  , but 
a l so  i n  r a the r  unsophisticated and minimally-attractive forms. Since basic 
needs do not presumably include c iga re t t e s ,  which have always and almost univer- 
s a l l y  been classed a s  an unnecessary luxury by governments, these a re  not high 
p r i o r i t y  items i n  a poor society.  Whatever solace i s  afforded by c iga re t t e s  
(and tobacco products generally 1 should be provided i n  "generic," t h a t  t h i s  
does not necessari ly imply low qua l i ty  as regards 'gessen t ia l 'Qroduc t  character- 
i s t i c s .  T h i s  can be done i n  l i n e  with culturally-indigenous t a s t e s  and product 
forms not unlike much of t he  l iquor industry i n  LDC's  a t  present. With a "tech- 
. nical" eff ic iency of production not much d i f f e r e n t  from TNC's and with a lower 
b 
eff ic iency i n  c rea t ing  demand f o r  these kinds of products, smaller nationally- 
owned firms ( e i t he r  public o r  p r iva te )  might be a much more r a t i ona l  solut ion 
f o r  LDC' s. 
The main problem with this kind of strateg.2 i s  obvious, a t  l e a s t  with 
respect  t o  the c iga re t t e  industry i n  Latin America: t o  a considerable degree, 
it has already been t r i e d  and found wanting. LDCs' markets do not e x i s t  i n  a 
vacuum. World-wide s h i f t s  t o  ce r t a in  types of product forms ( i n  p a r t  created 
by TNC's themselves) and the a b i l i t y  of TNC' s  t o  penetra te  these markets by 
one mechanism o r  another mean t h a t  "independent," nationally-owned firms with- 
out l inks  t o  TNC's w i l l  probably encounter a var ie ty  of d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  not  the  
l e a s t  of which i s  smuggling. This i s  pa r t i cu l a r ly  so where the  p o l i t i c a l  w i l l  
and capacity t o  hermetically s e a l  off the  nat ional  market is absent. But it 
may a l so  be t rue  where l oca l  manufacturing i s  somewhat shoddy and/or product 
forms a re  f a i r l y  id iosyncrat ic  a s  compared t o  the  l i g h t  tobacco f i l t e r  c iga re t t e  
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-- the  new "internat ional"  norm. The absence of some minimum degree of con- 
sumer nationalism i s  a l so  relevant,  Since f o r  various reasons these are  a l l  
l ike ly  t o  be charac te r i s t ic  of LDC's  i n  one degree or another, these nations 
are  l e f t  with the prospect of increased dependence, TNC dominance, and no easy 
choices for  t h e i r  l oca l  c igare t te  industries.  
I . Sauce: Snepf id ,  1980 (oased on USI)A estimates of t s t d  dom3stic output, . . a i  - !u llm ( Cnc8mvreP - legal, inports, 3.3. emports a d  i7ept.o. iu'acional de ?laneaci6n . . . . . \  I 






Burley Tobacco: Average Grower Prices 
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MOTES 
1. The terms r e f e r  t o  color  but  a l so  r e f l e c t  smoking qua l i ty .  Roughly, l i g h t  
tobaccos a r e  associated with mildness and c iga re t t e  manufacture, dark 
tobaccos with s t rength and much more non-cigarette usage, a s  i n  c igars .  See 
Shepherd, 1981: Appendix D. 
2. British-American Tobacco was o r ig ina l ly  a j o in t  venture of U.S. and English . 
tobacco firms (American Tobacco Co. and Imperial Tobacco Co.). Formed i n  1903, 
with two-thirds U,S. and one-third Br i t i sh  holdings, BAT was t he  r e s u l t  of a 
c a r t e l  agreement whereby American Tobacco would control  t he  U.S. market and 
Imperial the  U.K. makret while BAT would serve the  r e s t  of the  world outside 
the  U.S. and the  U,K. In  the  aftermath of the  1911 an t i - t ru s t  case (which 
broke up ablerican Tobacco), however, con t ro l  of BAT eventually sh i f ted  t o  
Br i t i sh  stockholders. Thus, since t he  ea r ly  19201s, BAT has been a B r i t i s h  
firm ( a  f a c t  not usual ly  real ized i n  Latin America). BAT is and has been f o r  
some t i m e  the  world's l a rges t  tobacco firm with. subs tan t ia l  holdings through- 
ou t  the  world, including Latin America (See Shepherd, 1979 and Table 3 below). 
3, In  Argentina, successive devaluations a l so  had a d i sas t rous  e f f e c t  on l oca l  firms 
by: (1) making it much more d i f f i c u l t  f o r  national f irms t o  import badly- 
I needed equipment t o  increase production e f f ic iency  and manufacture s imi la r  
I product forms; ( 2 )  making it d i f f i c u l t  f o r  nat ional  firms t o  pay roya l t i e s  on 
I TNC l icenses;  and, (3) i n f l a t i ng  the buying power of foreign currencies,  thus  
enabling TNC's  t o  buy stock i n  the  l oca l  f irms a t  bargain r a t e s  (already 
depressed, of course, bacause of t h e i r  d i f f i c u l t i e s  with smuggling). A l l  t h i s  
a l s o  took place i n  the context of a general political-economic pol icy oriented 
towards the  promotion of foreign investment by the  Ongania regime (Vilas,  1974: 
13-15). 
4. 1t is i n  t h i s  context t h a t  the  s ign i f ican t  upswing i n  U.S. c i ga re t t e  exports 
since the  l a t e  1960's should be interpreted.  U.S. c iga re t t e  exports were over 
70 b i l l i o n  i n  1978, valued a t  $692 mili ion.  This comprised over 10% of t o t a l  
U.S.  c i ga re t t e  output, the  l a rges t  percentage going abroad (other  than t o  U . S .  
Armed Services) since the  year 1920. Cigarette exports from the U.S. a re  now 
over 60% of the  value of leaf  tobacco exports, t r a d i t i o n a l l y  the  most import- 
a n t  U.S. tobacco export commodity (Data from the  U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, 
1978:4-5). While a number of f ac to r s  have influenced increasing expbrts--oil 
exporting s t a t e s '  imports, the  world-wide trend t o  "American Blend'' c i ga re t t e s ,  
and the  "mult ipl ier  e f fec t"  of the  presence of U,S. TNCsl operations abroad 
t h a t  is claimed by the  industry (Phi l ip  Morris, 1976:7)-- increased smuggling 
around the  world is a l so  a factor .  Since U.S. c iga re t t e  exports (legal. o r  
i l l e g a l )  t o  any given nat ional  market normally f a l l  off  dramatically a f t e r  the  
establishment of TNC operations i n  t h a t  market, continued high l eve l s  sf exports 
w i l l  l i k e l y  be dependent ,on the  a b i l i t y  of U.S.  m9C1s t o  " r o l l  over" from one 
market t o  another. Eventually, however, U.S. exports a r e  l i k e l y  t o  f a l l  off  
once overseas manufacturing f a c i l i t i e s  f o r  these brands have been set up i n  
most markets. There is s t i l l  considerable po t en t i a l  f o r  t h i s  kind of progress- 
ive  market penetration,  a s  markets i n  the  Mid East ,  Africa and Asia become 
4. (continued) 
"worthwhile," but one doubts t h a t  high leve ls  of e i t h e r  l ega l  o r  i l l e g a l  exports 
can be sustained f o r  a long period of time. 
Names, dates  and places cannot be c i t e d  but the  basic  ou t l ine  of the  TNC l i nks  
t o  smuggling can be revealed. One common pa t te rn  has apparently been the  employ- 
ment of l oca l ,  "national" advertising/publicity/marketing agencies t o  run 
interference with loca l  smugglers. I t  i s  understood t h a t  p a r t  of the  l oca l  
marketing agency's job is t o  dea l  with t he  kingpins of contraband i n  the  
general area  (say, Netherlands Ant i l l es  and Panama f o r  Colombia, o r  Paraguay 
fo r  Argentina). The primary TNC i n t e r e s t  is t o  make sure t h a t  t h e  company's 
brands are  "well representedw---perhaps sverwhePmingly so---in smuggling net-  
works and d i s t r ibu t ion  channels. "Seed money" needed f o r  developing o r  main- 
ta ining contraband d i s t r ibu t ion  systems and the  appropriate br ibes  t o  loca l  
smugglers can a l so  be t ransferred i nd i r ec t l y  through these  "marketing" person- 
ne l  using the loca l  advertsing/promotion budget. Not only i s  money thereby 
channeled t o  loca l  smuggling r ings ,  but,  s imilar ly ,  payoffs t o  customs o f f i c i a l s  
and other governmental personnel can be made i n  t h i s  manner without any d i r e c t  
involvement by corporate employees. 
Given the s i ze  of the  parent firms, it is perhaps not surpr is ing t o  f ind  
these c iga re t t e  TNCsl  subsidiar ies  among the  l a rges t  i ndus t r i a l  firms i n  Latin 
America. In 1972, 1 0  of the l a rges t  130 indus t r i a l  firms i n  Latin America were 
tobacco firms, and e igh t  of these were subsidiar ies  of TNC' s :  Souza Cruz 
(Brazil-4th);  Nobleza (Argentina-23rd) ; La Moderna (Mexico-36th) ; Massalin y 
Celasco (Argentina-77th)' Cigarros E l  Aguila (Mexico-84th); Piccardo (Argent- 
ina-103rd); Imparciales (Argentina-104th); and Par t icu la res  (Argentina-128th) 
(Frenkel e t  a l . ,  1974). These firms a r e  a l so  important i n  t h e i r  respective 
national economies. In Argentina, fo r  instance,  Nobleza (BAT)was continuously 
ranked among the  top 15 indus t r i a l  concerns from 1960=1974, and Piccardo 
(Liggett)  , Massalin y Celasco (Phi l ip  Morris) , Par t icu la res  and Imparciales 
(both Reemtsma) were a l so  ranked i n  the  top 50 firms during those years. 
It i s  of some i n t e r e s t  t o  see precisely  how t h i s  market growth took place.  
The demand creat ion e f f o r t s  were successfully d i rec ted  a t  three  basic  groups: 
women and young non-smokers a s  w e l l  a s  o lder  smokers of the  more idiosyncratic 
domestic product form ( i n  Latin America these a r e  usually cheaper, shor t  (70m1, 
non-f i l ter ,  dark tobacco brands). The basic  idea underlying demand c rea t ion  
campaigns aimed a t  women and adolescents i s  obvious: t o  c rea te  primary demand 
growth where the  marginal ef i fc iency of demand creat ion techniques i s  of ten 
highest. This a l so  has the  appealing feature  of providing a "positive-sum" 
game f o r  the  firms. The s t ra tegy behind demand creat ion techniques aimed a t  
es tabl ished smokers of the  older domestic product forms is more complex. The 
e f f o r t  t o  move these smokers towards more expensive, "sophist icated" product 
forms (although of ten s t i l l  "national" brands) was designed t o  el iminate 
r e l a t i ve ly  cheap, unprofitable brands where appropriabi l i ty  is  much lower ( a s  
a re ,  incidental ly ,  the ba r r i e r s  t o  entry  t o  new competition).,The s t ra tegy  of 
"converting" established smokers t o  more "advanced" more expensive product 
forms even involved the  creat ion of a new "hybrid" product form i n  Argentina-- 
7. (continued) . 
--the "mixed" l i g h t  and dark tobacco c iga re t t e  (Table 1). By using revised 
versions of some of t he  o lder  brand names, and by mixing dark tobacco with 
l i g h t  tobacco i n  longer, f i l t e r e d  product forms, these  smokers could be more 
e a s i l y  weaned from the  older ,  cheaper products. 
8. Reported adver t is ing expenditures were ac tua l ly  l a rge r  than reported earnings 
(108%) fo r  Ph i l i p  Morris' Massalin y Celasco subsidiary i n  1967. High l eve l s  
of adver t is ing a l s o  produced reported l o s se s  f o r  th ree  of t he  f i v e  TNC subs- 
i d i a r i e s  i n  Argentina during t he  years 1967-1970, 
9. Domestic versions of t he  " internat ional  brands" made "under l icense" a r e  
frequently considerably d i f f e r en t  from t h e  o r ig ina l  brand manufactured and 
sold  i n  the  home market. This i s  not simply because of loca l  governemtnal 
requirements mandating the  usage of some minimum proportion of local ly-  
grown tobacco, e i t he r .  One example may serve t o  i l l u s t r a t e  the  point .  In  
Argentina, t he  locally-made a n t  i s  a l a rge  s e l l e r  and i s  c l ea r ly  advertised 
a s  employing the  "Famous Micronite F i l t e r  ( the  phrase even appears across 
the  f ron t  of the  pack i t s e l f ) .  Technically, however, t h i s  is  simply not t rue .  
The "Micronite F i l t e r1 '  is an iden t i f i ab ly  d i f f e r en t  f i l t e r  rod patented i n  
the  U . S .  ( a s  a r e  many other  f i l t e r  mate r ia l s ) .  But the  f i l t e r  used i n  Kents 
i n  Argentina is  i n  f a c t  indist inguishable from the f i l t e r  rod mater ia ls  used 
i n  most of the  other  f i l t e r  c iga re t t e s  i n  Argentina, a'nd i s  de f in i t e ly  not 
a "Micronite F i l t e r .  " 
10. Evenat the  height of in te rna t iona l  brand populari ty i n  Argentina during 1975 
(because the combination of governmental p r i ce  cont ro l s  and extreme r a t e s  of 
i n f l a t i on  had made the  more expensive"internationa1 brands" r e l a t i ve ly  cheap), 
these brands accounted f o r  only some 32.7% of the  Argentine c iga re t t e  market 
by volume of s a l e s  (Data from Camara de l a  Industr ia  de l  Cigar r i l lo ,  1945). 
11. On the other  hand, U.S. Ws" p r o f i t a b i l i t y  abroad has apparently not matched 
t h a t  of its domestic business i n  c igare t tes .  From 1974 t o  1978, f o r  example, 
Ph i l ip  Morris reported t h a t  between 25.2-29.5% of i ts  "Operating Revenues" came 
from abroad but only 19.5-23.4% of i t s  "Operating Income" did. Likewise, i t s  
r a t i o  of Operating Income" t o  "Operating Revenue w a s  between 10.4 and 12.0% 
i n  1974-78 on in te rna t iona l  operations vs. a much higher 19.1-23.3% on i ts  
domestic c iga re t t e  busines (Phi l ip  Morris, Inc..  1978). There a r e  several  
possible  reasons f o r  lower p r o f i t  r a t e s  abroad and lower p r o f i t  r a t e s  abroad 
than European ISNC's l i k e  BAT and Rothman's. U.S. TNC1s ,  being latecomers t o  
in te rna t iona l  operations,  may s t i l l  be involved i n  extensive cross-subsidiz- i 
a t ion  e f f o r t s ,  thus  Lowering o w r s e a s  p r o f i t a b i l i t y .  Ph i l i p  Morris, f o r  
example, i s  incurring large losses  i n  Brazi l  t o  gain a foothold there ,  challeng- 
ing BATqs overhwelming dominance i n  the Brazil ian market. Different pa t te rns  
of t r ans fe r  pr ic ing may a l so  reduce U.S. TNCs' reported p r o f i t s  abroad. Differ-  
e n t  l eve l s  of excise and other  taxes  may a l so  explain some of these differences.  
A s  compared with the  U.S. c iga re t t e  business, foreign c iga re t t e  markets a re  
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generally characterized by higher excise taxes ,  lower un i t  p r o f i t  margins, lower- 
pr iced products (before t axes ) ,  more extensive p r i ce  controls ,  and lower l eve l s  
of per cap i ta  consumption. Moreover, faced with t he  stagnation of s a l e s  i n  the  
U.S. because of the  smoking/health issue,  it is poosible t h a t  U.S. firms have 
* 
decided t o  take a s  much p r o f i t  a s  possible i n  the  domestic market t o  finance t h e i r  
overseas tobacco'businesses and finance domestic non-tobacco d ivers i f ica t ion  
projects .  A l l  t h i s  suggests t h a t ,  high a s  overseas subs id ia r ies '  p r o f i t  r a t e s  
might be, they s t i l l  do not r i v a l  those of domestic c iga re t t e  operations f o r  U.S .  
firms . 
12. The rapid s h i f t  t o  tabaco rubio and the condit ions under which it was introduced 
i n  Latin America have a l s o  led t o  enormous economic waste. Most l i g h t  tobaccos 
(especial ly  flue-cured and o r i en t a l )  a r e  not easy crops t o  manage. They require 
e n t i r e l y  d i f f e r en t  and technologically d i f f i c u l t  harvesting and curing processes, 
a r e  more demanding i n  terms of s o i l  requirements, cu l t iva t ion  prac t ices ,  e t c .  
They a r e  crops whose technology and qua l i ty  production evolved over r e l a t i ve ly  
long periods of time i n  t h e i r  countr ies  of or igin .  For example, f i f t y  years 
a f t e r  the  introduction on a large scale  of flue-curing i n  North Carolina, 
complaints about poor qua l i ty  curing were s t i l l  common i n  the  1920's among 
leaf buyers (T i l l ey ,  1948). In Latin America, considerable economic resources 
invested i n  tabaco rubio were simply wasted or l o s t  i n  crop f a i l u r e s  of one s o r t  
o r  another; a reas  unsuitable fo r  production had t o  be abandoned a f t e r  large 
investments had been made; acceptable tobacco from the f i e l d  was l o s t  by poor 
curing and hadnling, e t c . ,  e t c .  Thus, it is not uncommon i n  r u r a l  Latin America 
t o  see abandoned flue-curing barns where tobacco is  no longer being produced, 
mute monuments t o  t h i s  waste. 
13. These estimates a r e  based on various s tud ies  of the  d i s t r ibu t ion  of cost  items 
of r e t a i l  value by major economic agents i n  the  industry i n  Argentina and 
Colombia (Estudio Sur, 1975; Republica de Colombia, Depto. Nacional de Plan- 
eacion, 1975) . 
14. In  addi t ion,  TNC c iga re t t e s  made abroad ( e i t h e r  by subsidiar ies  o r  l icensees)  
a r e  usaually much higher i n  t a r  and nicot ine  than t h e i r  look-alike brands i n  
t he  U.S. For example, a recent comparison t e s t  showed t h a t  Marlboro, Kent, 
Chesterf ie ld ,  and Kool averaged 17.5 mg. t a r  i n  the U . S .  while the same brands 
made i n  the  Phil ippines averaged 31.8 mg. t a r  (Ross, 1980:144-45). In p a r t ,  
these dif ferences  may be explained by loca l  content regulations.  There i s ,  
however, another basic  reason why the  diffucion of more advanced, low t a r /  
n icot ine  product forms t o  LDC's  has been so slow. Locally-mandated r u l e s  on 
the  use and a v a i l a b i l i t y  of many of the  basic inputs i n  c iga re t t e  manufacture 
f o r  import subs t i tu t ion  indus t r ia l i za t ion  reasons of ten cause considerable 
di f ferences  i n  cigarette-making cost  s t ruc tures  i n  L D C ' s  vs. those cha rac t e r i s t i c  
of D C ' s .  In indus t r ia l i zed  nations,  leaf  tobacco i s  normally the  most expensive 
input by f a r .  F i l t e r  rod mater ia l ,  c iga re t t e  paper, wrapping mater ia ls ,  packag- 
ing, e tc .  a r e  a l l  r e l a t i ve ly  ins ign i f ican t  cos t s .  Hence, complex f i l t e r  designs, 
14. (continued) . 
low density,  high-porosity c iga re t t e s  wityh "puffed" tobacco and low t a r /  
n icot ine  delivery a r e  i n  f a c t  cheaper t o  manufacture than a r e  higher tar /nicot ine  
products whish contain more tobacco. The o ld ,  70mm and 85mm non-f i l ter  c iga re t t e s  
a r e  the  most expensive s f  a l l  brandsit0 produce i n  D C ' s .  In  E D C s s  however, the  
cos t  . s t ructure  i s  of ten reversed: tobacco is cheap while other  inputs--often 
C 
imported o r  avai lable  loca l ly  from other  o l i gopo l i s t i e  and high cos t  suppliers-- 
a r e  r e l a t i ve ly  more expensive. Not only would the  higher cos t s  of more sophist- 
icated low tar /nicot ine  f i l t e r  c iga re t t e s  possibi ly  a f f e c t  m i t  p r o f i t a b i l i t y ,  
but more importantly, higher c iga re t t e  p r i ce s  f o r  these brands would possibly 
reduce aggregate s a l e s  given t h e  higher p r i ce -e l a s t i c i t i e s  of demand typ i ca l  
of c iga re t t e s  i n  LDC'S, i n  tu rn ,  the  r e s u l t  of lower per cap i ta  income, unequal 
income d i s t r i bu t ion ,  e t c .  Thus, there  a r e  a t  present very few economic incent ives  
t o  promote the  dif fusion of more advanced product forms i n  LDC's. 
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